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1. Preface 
 
While writing the last parts of this L.L.M thesis, a mass influx of asylum seekers overwhelms 
Europe which seems to provide me with relevant and very telling anecdotes almost on a daily 
basis. As Germany is confronted with a record number of asylum seekers reaching its borders 
and challenging the limits of its capacity to facilitate the reception of so many of them, reports 
have indicated it has started to host some few dozen asylum seekers in the Nazi concentration 
camp of Buchenwald1. Although the report has later turned out to be incorrect, the Israeli 
media have continued to proliferate it with a deep undertone of abomination, criticizing 
Germany for having resolved the asylum seekers’ accommodation shortage “in bad taste”2. 
 
From a somewhat naïve point of view, this sudden eruption of outrage within the Israeli-
Jewish public is not at all obvious; What seems to be clear is rather the truly remarkable irony 
of history when a death camp becomes a shelter for refugees and displaced people. But isn’t it 
exactly what makes the alleged metamorphosis of Buchenwald so moving? Wouldn’t it be 
possible to imagine also a different reaction to that story coming from the descendants of a 
people that have witnessed persecution and deprivation of due asylum trough the complacency 
of the world’s nations? Allegedly compelled by the obvious moral imperative of the 
Holocaust, wouldn’t it be more appropriate for those descendants of Jewish Holocaust 
refugees to praise Germany instead of denouncing it for the unreserved efforts it has been 
making in order to meet the acute needs of present day asylum seekers and refugees?  
 
It is quite explicit that the outrage expressed by the Israeli media has nothing to do with, for 
example, violation of human rights or deprivation of humanitarian needs, which Buchenwald 
is historically associated with, but rather with the Israeli-Jewish public’s fear that 
Buchenwald, or any place or concept associated with the Holocaust, would be appropriated by 
others or applied to other similar situations involving others. In this case, and even on the 
expense of contemporary asylum seekers, Buchenwald the Signifier, must remain attached to 
only one particular Signified –  the Jewish inmate it was designed for – rather than being 
thought of also as a place of refuge for those contemporary asylum seekers and refugees.  
 
This sort of ‘Holocaust possessiveness’ is manifested time and again by Jewish and Israeli 
actors in their effort to establish and preserve the notion that the Holocaust is a categorically 
unique historical event. This ideological perception is one of the two central pillars of what 
                                                                 
1 L Willgress, ’Refugees Fleeing to Europe Living in Nazi Barracks at Buchenwald’, Dailymail, 11.9.2015 – 
www.dailymail.co.uk/.../Housed-notorious -concentration-camp-Refugees-fled-Europe-better-life-living-
former-Nazi-barracks-Buchenwald-thousands-slave-labourers-died-subjected-medical-experiments.html  
2 ‘Germany Not Housing Refugees at Buchenwald Concentration Camp’, Haaretz, 14.9.2015; ‘Symbolism 
Without Tact: Refugees Were Hosted in Nazi Concentration Camp’, Israelhayom, 15.9.2015 –  
www.israelhayom.co.il/article/3136119; ‘In Bad Taste: Refugees Are Being Housed at the Buchenwald 
Concentration Camp’, ynet, 11.9.2015 – www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4700081.  
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Norman Finkelstein defines as ‘the Holocaust framework’, and is used by those actors who are 
constantly engaged in, and lead to the trivialization or the complete denial of the claimed 
genocidal experiences of other victim groups3. 
 
committed to this central dogma for its desirable political consequences, that is, the 
distribution of the whole moral capital to be conferred on genocidal victim - groups to the 
Jewish people alone and, inter alia, shielding Israel from any criticism of its otherwise 
indefensible conducts, diaspora and Israeli Jews in different fields – Holocaust and genocides 
studies, diplomacy, politics and commemoration – engage in the contentious struggle over the 
Holocaust’s uniqueness and lead to the marginalization or the complete denial of the claimed 
genocidal experiences of other victim-groups.  
 
This L.L.M thesis reviews the Israeli state of affairs in the asylum context, which may be best 
defined as ‘the denial of (contemporary) refugee-hood’. That state of affairs is exemplified, 
inter alia, in the un-typical governmental- minded judicial approach displayed by the Israeli 
judges when they decide on appeals against the administrative decision for not recognizing 
asylum seekers as refugees. While some academic attention has already been given to the 
virtually 0% refugee recognition rate at first instance of the Israeli administrative authority, the 
fact that the Israeli Courts have only twice so far begged to differ with the state and ordered 
the government to grant asylum seekers appellants the refugee status, was never before a 
subject to academic research. 
 
The first section of the opening chapter provides an introduction to the Israeli asylum 
condition, with the illusory asylum requests being lodged in Israel at its center, while the 
second section of that chapter outlines the prevalent portrait of the Israeli Courts, especially in 
the international arena.  
 
Although the fact that this thesis’ focal point is under-researched may be a sufficient reason to 
stage the Israeli judiciary in the asylum context at the center of even the most modest 
academic research, my motivation to do so is derived rather from the tension between the 
image of the Israeli Court as being extremely pro-active, perhaps the most daring Court in the 
world, and the Court’s actual performance in cases regarding disputes between the state and its 
non (Jewish) citizens. At the forefront of these cases, first and foremost, are those relating to 
the Palestinian Occupied Territories and their inhabitants, which were the subject of David 
Kretzmer’s seminal work4; those relating to the naturalization of the only 170 asylum seekers 
                                                                 
3 N G Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry, Verso, London, 2000, p.41 
4 D Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories, State 
University of New York Press, 2001 
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who were ever recognized as refugees in Israel5; and also, as I would like to suggest in this 
thesis, to asylum appeals concerning specifically the recognition of asylum seekers as 
refugees.  
 
These types of cases unfold the discrepancy between the Israeli Court’s bias in favor of 
omission in interfering with administrative decisions on the one hand, and its mostly pro-
active judicial approach in cases relating to all other disputes between the individual and the 
state on the other. What makes any study on this phenomenon within the Israeli Court’s 
jurisprudence even more interesting and of high political importance, is that the perception of 
the Israeli judiciary as a robust liberal agent within Israeli society is still highly prevalent on 
the international level. The irony is that this very misconception about the Israeli Courts 
results in the attribution of legitimacy to the state of Israel, as being the only democracy in the 
middle-east, which in turn serves as a key pillar for the ones who seek to mitigate Israel’s 
conducts specifically in relation to the territories it occupies and colonizes for the last 48 years, 
which then double the irony by producing for the Courts exactly those cases in which their 
most governmental minded judicial approach is being enacted. It is rather obvious that 
exposing the Court’s bias in cases relating directly to the Occupied Territories is more relevant 
to the international community’s concerns about Israel, but scrutinizing the Court’s 
jurisprudence also in asylum cases, which just like the ones related to the Occupied Territories 
pose a challenge to the Zionist’s ethos, may nevertheless help to constitute a paradigm 
regarding the limits of the Court’s alleged daring judicial approach. 
 
I would like to claim that the relation between this two types of case – the ones relating to the 
Occupied Territories and the asylum appeals – is vertical. It is so in the way that the creation 
and the maintenance of the uniqueness thesis about the Holocaust result in a sort of 
justification for some of Israel’s illiberal and undemocratic conducts, and first and foremost its 
ongoing occupation of the Palestinian Territories.  
 
The argument about the Holocaust’s uniqueness implies that no other claimed example of 
genocide has actually been a-genocide, and so it brings about the exclusive allocation of the 
whole moral capital produced by the ‘genocide-recognition industry’ to the Jewish people, and 
more specifically to the Jewish state. This abundant moral capital is not the only source of 
justification that stems from the uniqueness thesis; the argument about the Holocaust’s 
uniqueness, and the situation of the Holocaust right at center of Jewish-identity, creates a blunt 
distinction between Jews, who have indeed experienced such a genocide, and all other people, 
who have not. And so, in believing that anyone who has not been undertaken by a similar 
                                                                 
5Y Livnat, ‘Permanent Status in Country of Asylum’ (in Hebrew), immigrants in Israel: social and legal aspects, 
2014 
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trauma, which is so deeply intertwined with their identity, cannot fully penetrate the meaning 
of their existence and truly understand their acts and motivations, the Jewish people and the 
Jewish state discard any criticism that comes from the outside of the Jewish world regarding 
Israel’s expansionism and its ever growing appetite for militaristic power. 
 
In this L.L.M thesis I am following a number of eminent scholars who have attributed those 
ideological and political motivations to the mainly Jewish and Israeli actors who devote 
themselves to the furthering of the uniqueness thesis in their respective fields of knowledge. In 
my view, from the culmination of those corresponsive activities emerges a pattern that can and 
should be applied to the Israeli judges in their abnormal reluctance from interfering in 
administrative decisions by recognizing present day asylum seekers as refugees.     
 
In the larger scope, there is a lot in common between Jewish and Jewish-Israeli historians, 
diplomats or museum directors, with their persistent effort to reject the calls of other victim-
groups for recognition of their own tragedy as a genuine genocide, and the Israeli judges that 
in the same vain derogate from the constitutive theoretical principles of their field of work 
when it comes to the dealing with the Holocaust.  
 
As much as the Jewish-Israeli genocide scholar may fear the decline in value, morally and 
politically, of the Holocaust, as a result of possible recognition of other tragedies as additional 
valid examples in line with the Holocaust, which all belong to the general category of the 
definition ‘genocide’, the Israeli judge must also believe that the Holocaust would lose its 
uniqueness if the legal definition of ‘refugee’ is applied to the situation of contemporary 
asylum seekers. Conceptually situating them in the same group of the Jewish -refugees who 
fled from Nazi-Germany, might then dissipate the “Israeli advantage” in “justifiably” keeping 
the whole moral capital to itself.  
 
In the second chapter I shall present and elaborate about the Holocaust’s uniqueness thesis, 
and its promotion by its proponents in different fields, and especially within history studies.   
 
What might make the definition ‘refugee’ intimately associated with the Holocaust in the 
Israeli judges’ mind is the Jewish context of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, and the conventional wisdom about Israel’s historical commitment to the refugee 
protection regime it has established. For them, the Refugee Convention connotes so strongly 
to the Holocaust, that when they examine its applicability and implementation in a specific 
case, the memory of the Jewish-refugee who fled his Nazi perpetrators is being instantly 
evoked. In other words, the Jewish context of the Convention serves as a nexus between the 
Holocaust with its Jewish refugees and the contemporary forms of persecution and the 
refugees resulting from them. Rather than considering the international refugee law as their 
 01 
 
only valid point of reference, the judges are more attached – consciously or not – to the 
Holocaust framework and to what lies at its center, the Holocaust’s uniqueness. Compelled by 
the ideological imperative to distinguish the Holocaust from any other historical atrocity, and 
so to avoid such possible implication if comparing the legal situation of the Holocaust’s 
refugees to the contemporary asylum seekers, the judges seem to mistake the unique form of 
persecution witnessed by the Jewish-refugees for the actual yardstick with which to measure 
the appellant’s entitlement for the refugee status. 
  
In the third chapter I examine the involvement of Israel and Jewish organizations in the 
drafting and acceptance of the Refugee Convention, as well as the sources for the conventional 
wisdom about Israel’s historical commitment to the Convention, and its fallacy.    
 
In the last chapter of this thesis I conduct an analysis of the figurative language used by the 
judges in trying to establish - through the allusions occasionally made by them to the 
Holocaust at large and more commonly to the Jewish context of  the Refugee Convention - 
that when thinking about the asylum seeker appellant standing before them, they also bear in 
mind a phantom of the Jewish refugee, whose suffering’s magnitude overshadows any 
possible fear of being prosecuted proclaimed by the actual appellant. Since present day asylum 
seekers do not withstand the unique standards of persecution witnessed by those poor 
phantoms of Jewish refugees, their asylum claims are inevitably being discarded and 
consequently they all pass for nothing but mere economical migrants, a fact that is exemplified 
in the inexistent refugee recognition rate both at first instance and at the Court level.          
 
 
                                       
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 00 
 
2. Israel: a Safe Haven for Whom?  
 
2.1. The Asylum Condition: Introduction 
 
During the years 2006-2012 Israel was confronted for the first time in its history with large 
numbers of asylum seekers, mainly from Eritrea and Sudan. Until late 2013, when the 
construction of 230 km of surveillance fence along large parts of the Egyptian border was 
completed, several hundred African asylum seekers crossed the border on a monthly basis. In 
order to fulfill their right to seek asylum, these African asylum seekers were willing to risk 
their lives in a harsh journey through the Sinai desert, an infamous trade zone of weapons, 
drugs, and women6. 
 
From its birth until this crucial period, Israel had had to deal with only a small number of 
requests for asylum lodged within its territory, and the issue of asylum seekers had therefore 
never  before been considered to be of major concern to the Israeli society. Despite its central 
role in the drafting of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and its being a 
signatory to the convention already in 1954 and to the convention's 1967 protocol in 1968, Israel 
has never since then drafted a domestic refugee law, and not until 2001 was an administrative 
agency finally established in order to handle asylum applications. 
 
In the past, the issue of asylum seekers has seldom made headlines in Israel, and when it has, it 
was always in relation to Israel's own initiatives to admit groups of asylum seekers as a 
humanitarian gesture. In 1977, for example, Prime Minister Menachem Begin authorized 
citizenship for several hundred Vietnamese refugees. Marooned in the South China Sea in a 
leaky boat, an Israeli captain took them in, bringing them to Israel after they had been denied 
refuge in Taiwan. Begin granted the refugees citizenship in his first act as newly-elected prime 
minister. He explained to President Carter: "we never have forgotten the boat with 900 Jews, 
having left Germany in the last weeks before the Second World War… traveling from harbor 
to harbor, from country to country, crying out for refuge. They were refused… Therefore it 
was natural… to give those people a haven in the land of Israel"7. 
 
Indeed, the Israeli-Jewish public has never forgotten the atrocities of the Holocaust and the 
suffering of its victims. The memory of the Holocaust still occupies a central place in 
everyday life in the Israeli society, and society's notion of Jewish-Israelis as the direct heirs of 
the Holocaust victims is a key pillar of the Israeli-Jewish identity. But while the Israeli-Jewish 
public's collective memory of the Holocaust is still so vivid 70 years after the end of WW2, the 
somewhat natural ethical implications of the Holocaust apparently perceived by Prime 
                                                                 
6
 M Van Reisen, M Estefanos and C Reijken, ‘ Human Trafficking in The Sinai: Refugees Between Life and 
Death’, Wolf legal Publishers, Brussels, 2012 
7 Lisa Goldman, I remember when Israel rescued non-Jewish refugees, +972 (Sep.6, 2012) – http://972mag.com/i-
rememeber-when-israel-rescued-non-jewish-refugees/55387/  
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Minister Begin do not seem to count that much when it comes to Israel's willingness to 
provide international protection to present day asylum seekers from Africa. 
 
In Israel, only a very few of the tens of thousands of asylum seekers have been granted refugee 
status under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Since the ratification of 
the convention, only 170 asylum seekers have been recognized as refugees by the Israeli 
administrative authority. In 2013, only six asylum seekers were granted the Geneva 
Convention status while 491 applicants were rejected8. This adds up to a recognition rate of 
1.2%. In 2012, again only six asylum seekers were recognized as refugees, while 1,131 
applicants were rejected (a recognition rate of 0.57%)9. And in 2011, eight asylum seekers were 
granted Geneva Convention status, while 4,270 applications were rejected (recognition rate of 
0.19%)10. These figures are significantly low in comparison with the recognition rate of 
refugees in other liberal democracies, which range from 10% - 50%11. The Israeli recognition 
rate for refugee status is more or less on the same scale of the notorious success rate at first 
instance of only 0.4% in Greece in 2008, a figure that was deemed to be so low that alongside 
some other troubling findings has brought the European Court of Human Rights to define 
asylum applications lodged in Greece as nothing more than 'illusory'12. 
 
And yet, the asylum - condition in Israel is more multifaceted than what those dry figures 
reveal; Although Israel revokes almost all of the asylum applications lodged within its 
territory, it allegedly complies with the principle of Non-Refoulment with respect to 90% of 
the asylum –seekers it absorbs, that is, it refrains from forcefully expel them on the grounds 
that their lives and freedoms may be at risk if returned to their countries of origin13. The 
decision not to deport these mainly Sudanese and Eritreans nationals back to their countries of 
origin should nevertheless be considered within the broader context of the many restrictions 
imposed on them, whose sole aim is that of rendering their lives so miserable while staying 
within Israel’s borders, as to evoke their will for 'voluntary return' to their countries of origin. 
 
At the same time as it has been refraining from coercively deporting Eritreans and Sudanese - 
who still constitute the largest group of asylum seekers within its territory - Israel has failed to 
adhere to a consistent manner of defining its policy toward them in terms of temporary group 
protection or other sort of subsidiary protection. In the course of representing numerous 
asylum seekers in Israeli Courts over the first few years since the influx began, I repeatedly 
confronted with contradictory statements by the state in answer to the question of whether it 
                                                                 
8No Refuge, Hotline for Refugees and Migrants, Tel Aviv, 2014, p.11 (Mali Davidian, Freedom of information 
Law supervisor, Population and Immigration Authority, in her letter to advocate Elad Kahana, 2014) 
9 Ibid., p.11 
10 Ibid., p.11 
11UNHCR Global Trends 2013, Annexes, Table 10 (June 2014) - http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends/2013-
Global|Trends-annex-tables.zip   
12 See M.S.S v. Belgium And Greece, Application no. 30696/09 (21 January 2011) 
13 HCJ 7385/13 Eitan – Israeli Immigration Poilicy Center et al. V. the Israeli Government, preamble 31 to the 
majority central opinion 
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applies a policy of temporary group protection with respect to these populations. In court, the 
state denied applying such a policy when asked whether the detention of one of my clients 
actually served a proper purpose; according to the Israeli Supreme Court's case-law, a person 
cannot be held in detention if he/she cannot be deported within a short period of time. Thus, in 
order to obscure the fact that a deportation process for a certain detainee was not to be 
furthered any time soon, the state had simply denied applying temporary group protection in 
relation to him/her. Instead, it attributed its evident lack of a deportation process to technical 
problems that may or may not be solved soon. At the same time, but in the framework of other 
legal procedures, when the question before the Court was whether a certain asylum seeker was 
entitled to go through an RSD procedure, the state  proclaimed that due to temporary group 
protection applied to the population he/she belongs to, it has no duty to examine his/her 
individual asylum claims. 
 
Over the course of the years, Israel has maybe used different terminology to define its policy 
towards Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers, but it remains undisputed that in practice it 
refrains from deporting them back to their countries of origin. Although its officials have used 
the term 'temporary group protection' in many formal documents14, at a certain point the 
Ministry of Interior completely stopped using this term and denied having ever applied such a 
policy in relation to Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers. The state probably realized that the 
rights given to these asylum seekers fall significantly short from the bundle of minimum rights 
provided for specific groups by other liberal-democracies in case they decide to employ a 
similar policy of temporary protection15. 
 
Nowadays, the state uses the term 'temporary policy of non-refoulement' only in relation to the 
Eritrean asylum seekers. 
 
In other words, Israel’s policy of non-refoulement reflects its obligations under the 
international law and is in line with its domestic law, but at the same time Israeli officials 
insist on defining the Eritrean asylum seekers as mere 'mistanenim' (Literately: infiltrators) 
who only seek to improve their economic condition by exploiting the state's generous asylum 
system. Instead of admitting the simple fact that the temporary group protection - or to give it 
its updated name, the 'temporary policy of non-refoulement' - indeed reflects the state's 
acknowledgment that these specific groups of asylum seekers are likely to face persecution if 
returned to their countries of origin, the state has chosen to fuel the public's hostility by using 
                                                                 
14 No Refuge, p.15. (Haim Efraim, director of the Refugee Status Determination Unit, in his letter to the Hotline 
for Refugees and Migrants, 10.12.2009 ) 
15 Compare – Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event 
of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of effort between Member States in 
receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (See, especially, Articles 8, 12, 13, which concern 
the right to reside, work and the admittance to the welfare system); it is noteworthy to mention that the directive’s 
provisions have never been triggered so far, and that the protection offered by it is destined to be of limited 
duration.  
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ever growing rejectionist rhetoric, detaining many of them for long periods, depriving all of 
them of work visas and limiting their presence to restricted areas. 
 
These contradictory policies and declarations of the state, which one commentator defines as 
an intentional practice of "order disorder"16, were actually meant to render the lives of the 
already present asylum seekers so miserable they would rather "voluntarily return" to their 
countries of origin, and at the same time to deter others from crossing into the state in search 
of asylum. 
 
It was not hard to reach that conclusion about the real, hidden, purpose behind Israel's 
contradicting policies. As one prominent scholar in the field of international refugee law once 
told me, all states' attitudes toward asylum seekers stem from the same secret motivation to get 
rid of them all, but Israel is the only one to actually admit it publically17. Indeed, it was the 
former Minister of Interior himself who revealed the real purpose behind the state's 
contradicting policies toward the African asylum seekers, stating he would lock ‘infiltrators’ 
up "to make their lives miserable"18. His successor, the former Minister of the Interior, Gideon 
Sa'ar, who in reaction to the Supreme Court's decision to set aside section 30a of Amendment 
no. 3 to the Prevention of Infiltration Law, which allowed asylum seekers to be held in 
detention for a period of three years, has publicly bragged about the hundreds of Eritreans and 
Sudanese nationals who due to their long stay in detention have decided to "voluntarily return" 
to their countries of origin19. 
 
These are not only the abovementioned public statements of the Ministers of Interior that 
reveal the state's real intention behind its policy of the alleged 'temporary policy of non-
refoulement'. Its actual purpose is being reveled also and mainly from the direct outcome of 
those very policies – the decision made by hundreds of African asylum seekers to give up their 
right to seek asylum and to be deported despite the state's acknowledgment of the risk they are 
likely to face if returning to their countries of origin. It cannot, in all sincerity, be claimed that 
the state's policy, whatever language it was couched in, was employed in good faith, which is a 
general principle of international law20. 
 
While until the end of 2013 Eritrean and Sudanese nationals were not allowed to go through 
the RSD process in order to determine their possible entitlement to the refugee status, other 
nationals' asylum requests were examined by the administrative authority and almost none of 
                                                                 
16Y Paz,’Order disorder: African asylum seekers in Israel and discursive challenged to an emerging refugee 
regime’, New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR., 2011 
17 A conversation with Prof. Audrey Macklin, December 2014   
18O Efraim, ‘Yishai: Next phase – arresting Eritreans, Sudanese migrants’, YNET (Aug. 16, 2012) - 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-426950,00.html ("illegal migrants threat just as severe as Iranian 
nuke threat'; says will lock infiltrators up to 'make their lives miserable') 
19B Hartman, ‘Sa'ar: Hundreds of migrants returned home in Jun’, The Jerusalem Post, (Jun. 29, 2014); I will get 
back to the High Court of Justice’s ruling in this case in the forth chapter.   
20 C Burke, 'An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention’, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2013 
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them was granted the Geneva Convention status. For most of the period that I examine, that is, 
the years 2006-2012, only on some very few occasions was the state ordered by the Court to 
examine a certain Eritrean or Sudanese national's individual claims for asylum, and even then, 
under the Court's open eyes, the state has always reached a negative decision. 
 
In early 2012, only a short time after the establishment of South Sudan, Israel declared the end 
of the temporary group protection for Sudanese nationals that were allegedly entitled to South 
Sudanese citizenship (none of the thousands of targeted Sudanese nationals were actually 
granted citizenship at that time by the new-born state). Following this decision, several Israeli 
NGOs filed a petition with the District Court of Jerusalem to overturn the policy change; the 
Court dismissed the petition, but on the condition that when the temporary group protection 
regime came to an end, the state would finally allow each and every one of the South Sudanese 
nationals to go through the RSD process before his/her deportation21. The protection regime 
indeed came to an end, but the condition laid down by the Court was of little help to the 
alleged South Sudanese nationals. Not one of them was granted the Geneva Convention 
status; the Court’s decision in fact paved the way to the removal – by force or 'voluntarily' - of 
1,158 South Sudanese22. Several of the returnees, including children, died shortly after their 
deportation due to medication shortage and lack of medical care23.  
 
Later on, as a result of the entry into force of Section 30a of the Prevention of Infiltrators Law 
in 2013, Eritrean and Sudanese nationals were finally allowed to file asylum applications and 
to go through the RSD procedure in order to determine their entitlement to the Geneva 
Convention status. In practice, the state examined applications from no one except for the 
asylum seekers who were held in detention under the abovementioned law. 
 
From the figures the state revealed in Court, it seems that by March 2013, 444 applications of 
Eritrean nationals had been examined, only two of which were granted refugee status (less 
than 0.5%)24. While the refugee recognition rate of Eritreans in Israel is virtually zero, the 
worldwide recognition rate of Eritreans in 2012 was 81.9%25. In respect to Sudanese nationals, 
as of March 2014, decisions were taken in some 505 applications, and they were all negative. 
At the same time, the worldwide recognition rate of Sudanese in 2012 was 68.2%26. 
 
The Ministry of Interior informs the unsuccessful applicants about the negative decision in a 
standard letter, complemented by another standard letter, which states as follows – 
                                                                 
21 The District Court of Jerusalem – sitting as a Court of administrative matters, Case 53765-03-12 Asaf v. The 
Minister of Interior  (7.6.2012)  
22 No Refuge, p.19 
23
 N Arnon, ‘expelled from Israel – died of Malaria in South Sudan’, NRG, 24.8.2012   
24 HCJ 7146/12 Gavrisali v. the Knesset 
25 UNHCR Global Trends 2012, Annex (June 2013), Table 11- http://www.unhcr.org/52a723f89.html.  
26Ibid 
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.."it should be noted that, given the temporary policy of non-refoulement granted to Eritreans 
in Israel, due to the current situation in Eritrea, asylum seekers whose requests are rejected 
will not be returned to their country as long as the policy of non-refoulement stands"27. 
 
However, even if the Eritrean asylum seekers were not to "be returned to their countries" in a 
direct coercive manner, many of them eventually chose to withdraw their asylum applications 
and leave Israel. The factors contributing to this ‘choice’ are many:  their ongoing detention; 
the risk of being detained for long periods or even that of being arbitrarily detained for the 
second or third time after they were already released; their lack of access to the labor market; 
the extreme conditions of poverty they are forced to live in; and the many different forms of 
daily harassment they experience from the authorities themselves. 
 
According to the data provided by the Ministry of Interior, 1,687 Sudanese and 268 Eritrean 
asylum seekers 'voluntarily' left Israel in 201328. And in 2014, 4,005 Sudanese and 1,214 
Eritrean asylum seekers were 'voluntarily' removed29. 
 
At this point a few facts may be noteworthy, concerning the human rights condition in Eritrea, 
which nationals constitute the largest group of asylum seekers in Israel: national military 
service is mandatory for every Eritrean between the ages of 18 and 50; since refusal to perform 
military service amounts to imputed political opinion, for those who fled the country in order 
to avoid the compulsory service - which is true for most if not all of the Eritrean asylum 
seekers staying in Israel - the awaiting punishment when returned is one of five years' 
imprisonment under  inhumane conditions, many times without a trial or the right to appeal. 
According to the reports of some human rights NGOs, death in captivity is not unusual, nor is 
the disappearance of prisoners and detainees. For these reasons and others, the UNHCR 
determines that most Eritreans fleeing their country should be considered as refugees under 
the Geneva Convention, especially on the grounds of "political opinion". The extremely high 
world-wide recognition rate of Eritrean asylum seekers shows that other liberal democracies 
apart from Israel do in fact accept and follow the UNHCR's eligibility guidelines for assessing 
the international protection needs of Eritrean asylum seekers30. 
 
Israel, for its part, also seems to acknowledge the fact that Eritreans are likely to face 
persecution if returned to their country of origin, and its 'temporary policy of non-
refoulement', at least on the surface, reflects its awareness of the risks imposed on Eritreans 
asylum seekers if returned, and to its own obligations under international and domestic law. 
                                                                 
27 The Population and Immigration Authority in its letter to Mr. A.A. (3.3.2014)   
28 Population and Immigration Authority, foreign workers statistics (January 2014) - 
http://piba.gov.il/publicationAndTender/foreignWorkersStat/Documents/563343n80.pdf  
29 Population and Immigration Authority (October 2014) - 
http://piba.gov.il/publicationAndTender/foreignWorkersStat/Documents/564899cce.pdf 
30 UNHCR, Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Eritrea, 
https://www.ecoi.net/file-upload/90-1303373613-unhcr-eri20110420-guidelines.pdf  
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However, in examining the rights granted to the asylum seekers under that policy, or moreover 
the rights that are not granted to them, that is - the right to liberty and the right to life with 
dignity - it is clear that the state's policy does not provide asylum seekers with an adequate 
subsidiary protection. To put it more concretely, the implementation of this policy was never 
meant to actually prevent the risks to the lives and freedoms of asylum seekers, and those 
thousands  who were virtually pushed to possibly risking their lives on return to their countries 
of origin prove that this policy was made contrary to the fundamental doctrine of good faith. 
 
Quite in the same fashion, if we examine the outcomes of almost all RSD procedures, what 
would seem clear is that the administrative authority is acting in mala fides also in relation to 
the ones who are allowed to file an individual asylum application and to go through the 
procedure. If thousands of RSD procedures, many of which concern Eritreans and Sudanese 
nationals' claims, result in a total recognition rate of around 0%, it seems sound to determine 
that asylum applications lodged in Israel are merely illusory. The renouncement of thousands 
of Eritrean and Sudanese nationals from the permission to stay in Israel, combined with the 
virtually non-existent recognition rate of asylum seekers as refugees, represent the overall 
unfair approach of the administrative authorities toward asylum seekers and what appears to 
be its basic denial of the very existence of contemporary refugee-hood, as this thesis intends to 
claim.  
 
Although the right to asylum, as such, does not exist, if we look at the Israeli asylum system 
and at the impassable barriers it stages on the way of asylum seekers resulting in their poor 
chances of succeeding, it is far from clear whether asylum seekers in Israel are at all able to 
fulfill even their right to seek asylum. 
 
As the Israeli asylum system is governed by the administrative authority, in order to better 
understand the reasons for the practical inexistence of recognized refugees in Israel it may 
seem at first glance that one should focus particularly on the work of the Israeli Ministry of 
Interior, it being the governing body of the asylum system. 
 
And yet, the total recognition rate of asylum seekers as refugees, and even the ways and 
manners, broadly speaking, in which the asylum system functions, are enacted not only by the 
Ministry of Interior but also by the Courts. In Israel, the District Courts have the jurisdiction to 
adjudicate appeals field against negative decisions taken by the Ministry of Interior on asylum 
application31. It is also the District Court which performs judicial review over general policies 
conducted by the Ministry of Interior in relation to asylum seekers and the state's obligations 
towards them. 
 
                                                                 
31
 Administrative Matters Court Law – 2000 
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The extremely low percentage of refugee statuses given to asylum seekers by the 
administrative authority, and the inequity of the Israeli asylum system were already discussed 
in different contexts, however not sufficiently. Nevertheless, nothing has yet been written 
about the most interesting fact, in my opinion: namely that the Israeli Courts have so far made 
only two rulings overturning a decision of the Ministry of Interior and so recognizing asylum 
seekers as refugees. 
 
Although asylum adjudication is distinguished by a relatively high rate of challenge by those 
individuals whose applications for asylum were initially rejected by the administrative 
authority, most of the unsuccessful applicants in Israel would be incapable of carrying out the 
legal process of appeal by themselves32. Hence it seems clear that in the asylum context, the 
administrative authority's role predominates substantially over the role played by the Court, 
since the latter takes only a small number of decisions when compared with the Minister of 
Interior. Thus, from the asylum seekers’ point of view, my examination should probably give 
much more attention to the policies and conducts of the administrative authority, which indeed 
affects their lives more than any other agent of the state. 
 
However, I'm far more interested in shedding light on the role of the Israeli Courts in the 
asylum context. My high drive to stage the Israeli Courts, or more accurately, the Israeli judge 
in the Jewish state, does not stem from the fact that so far no attention at all has been paid to 
the Court's asylum adjudication33, although that might stand as a sufficient enough reason to 
conduct my inquiry in this direction. What makes this aspect of the asylum condition in Israel 
so appealing to me, is the image of the Israeli Courts as highly professional and independent 
ones, with the Israeli Supreme Court internationally perceived as perhaps the most activist 
Court in the whole world, and that image I wish to challenge.  
 
The other side of that coin is the Israeli political establishment’s attempt to pass for being 
modern, liberal and democratic by promoting in the international arena some of the Court's 
most liberal case-law. Quite ironically, the Israeli Diplomats boast of the very same rulings 
that are harshly contested and almost never complied with by the executive branch as it 
performs in front of the Israeli domestic audience. 
 
                                                                 
32 In Israel, the major part of asylum seekers are not eligible for free legal aid while going through RSD process or 
if wish to appeal against the administrative negative decision. Naturally, most of unsuccessful applicant lack the 
financial possibility to pay a lawyer and their only chance to challenge a negative decision is with the help of only 
few NGO's which offer legal aid and representation.    
33 From now on I will use the term ‘Israeli-judge’, although virtually all the judges who are competent to decide 
on asylum appeals are Jewish. In Israel, only 52 out of 672 judges are Palestinian citizens of Israel (That number 
amounts to only 7.7% of the judges in the Israeli judicial system, while the whole Arab population represents 
20.7% of the country’s population. Only 10 of those Arab-Israeli judges sit in the Districts Court, of which judges 
only some very few are nominated to serve also as judges for administrative matters and, inter alia, to adjudicate 
asylum appeals. See – G Lurie, ‘Appointing Arab Judges to the Courts in Israel’, Mishpat U’Mimshal, the 
University of Haifa Law Review, 2015, p.307.      
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In other words, the notion of the Israeli Court as an agent of liberalism in Israeli society, and 
the legitimacy Israel tries to gain out of that image of its Court, makes it important to examine 
whether the Court actually acts in such a manner, that is, furthering liberal values in an active 
fashion, also in relation to disputes between the state and non-Israeli citizens. 
 
Given the disparity existing not only between the percentage of refugees recognized at first 
instance in Israel and in other liberal democracies, but also between the recognition rates at the 
appeal level - that is, the overall number of asylum seekers being recognized as refugees by the 
Israeli Courts in comparison to the National Courts of other liberal democracies - the same 
exact questions arise regarding the work of both the Ministry of the Interior and the Israeli 
Court in the asylum context: Why is the recognition rate of asylum seekers as refugees in 
Israel so low when compared to other liberal democracies?34 Can this fact be explained only by 
the ways in which legal rules are phrased, interpreted and applied? Or is there something 
deeper at the root of this phenomenon? In light of the Jewish experience during the Holocaust, 
would it seem just to perceive Israel as having a special moral obligation towards asylum 
seekers and refugees? Do the Holocaust and the Israeli-Jewish public's collective memory of it 
play any role when the Jewish state's agents come to decide about a non-Jewish person's 
asylum claim? 
 
Even though at first glance both these questions and their answers can be equally applied to 
the role played by Israel's administrative authorities and Courts in regard to asylum 
adjudication, I shall focus here, for the reasons mentioned above, on the performance of the 
Court alone. In that spirit, I might as well leave out of my account the very few asylum seekers 
who have been recognized as refugees by the administrative authority, and further sharpen one 
of the abovementioned questions: If we accept the basic assumption that there must be, or 
have been, more than just two refugees within Israeli borders, and that there are, or have been 
more than those two asylum seekers who appealed to the Court against the administrative 
authority’s decision to revoke his/her asylum application – then why only two persons have 
ever been granted refugee status by the Courts? 
 
2.2. The Israeli Courts in the Asylum Context: Introduction 
 
I would like to open the discussion about the Israeli judiciary with a personal story of how I 
was first introduced to the issue of asylum seekers and refugees in Israel: immediately upon 
admission to the bar in 2008, I established my own law firm despite having only one client: the 
International Solidarity Movement (ISM). These human rights activists were doing volunteer 
work in the west bank, and from time to time some of them were dragged by the Israeli army 
into Israel's jurisdiction and then detained by the Minister of interior allegedly since they did 
                                                                 
34 For more details regarding the refugee recognition rate on appeal in different countries – see chapter 4. 
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not have permission to stay in the country. While visiting these clients of mine in the 
immigration detention facilities, I was amazed to realize that together with them, the wards 
were full of African men, women and children. This was already some time after the 
beginning of the influx of African asylum seekers into Israel, but somehow this fairly new 
phenomenon went under the radar of the Israeli media and so I was truly overwhelmed by 
what I saw; by and large none of these asylum seekers was represented by a lawyer or had 
been brought before a judge, and most of them did not even speak English. They were all 
waving the decisions of the administrative tribunal of the prison, which were all written in 
Hebrew. 
 
And so, when one of them was especially persistent, I agreed to represent her pro-bono. I 
never had the chance to examine their case files before they gave me the power of attorney, but 
I eventually represented each and every one of these sporadically chosen potential appellants. 
In other words, I did not even assess their legal situation before deciding whose chances 
seemed to justify an appeal against the decision to detain them. 
 
Several months later, I managed to release from detention seven out of eight persons in whose 
names I appealed to the District Courts. Some of them had been administratively detained for 
more than two years, while their asylum applications were never examined. Others claimed to 
be Eritreans or Sudanese, eligible for the temporary group protection given to nationals 
belonging to these populations, but the Ministry of Interior's conclusion was that they were not 
who they claimed to be, and that they were instead Ethiopian nationals. Needless to say these 
conclusions were not based on any - let alone a thorough - examination. In other cases the 
decision to detain them was taken by an unauthorized employee of the Ministry. 
 
As it turned out, an overwhelming majority of these hundreds of detainees were in fact asylum 
seekers, and they were detained without legal basis while their asylum claims should have 
been examined. Having no legal representation and being disconnected from their relatives in 
their countries of origin, or from anyone in Israel, they were destined to stay in jail for years on 
end or to give up their request for asylum. In the latter case they would have been deported 
back to their countries of origin, where they might face persecution. 
 
Each one of these cases exemplified the administrative authority's general lack of fairness 
toward the African asylum seekers, and it was the culmination of these eight cases that 
convinced me of the need to provide asylum seeking detainees with pro-bono legal aid and 
representation. 
 
Given the limited resources at its disposal, in addition to what seemed to be the most acute 
need of the asylum seeker population, the "We Are Refugees" NGO, which I jointly 
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established in 2010, was initially designated to provide asylum seekers held in administrative 
detention with pro-bono legal representation only in regard to their detention. And so, in the 
course of a few months, we appealed to the District Court in the name of dozens of asylum 
seeking detainees, and succeeded in releasing the vast majority of them from prison. After a 
short while we realized that without providing the released asylum seekers with legal aid also 
within the framework of the RSD procedure or the examination of their entitlement to 
temporary group protection, they were all destined to be placed back into detention facilities. 
Consequently, we decided to represent the asylum seekers we had released from detention also 
in regard to their entitlement to international legal protection. 
 
Since not one of the dozens we had represented in front of the administrative authority was 
amongst the 0.19% of asylum seekers recognized as refugees at first instance, we had to appeal 
to the Court for the second time in the name of the same people, but this time against the 
administrative authority's decision to revoke their asylum application. 
 
It was then that I first noticed the existence of two distinct, almost parallel, approaches of the 
Court: on the one hand, the judges were willing to conduct a meticulous judicial review 
regarding the administrative authority's decision to detain asylum seekers - its justification at 
first and its reasonableness as time passed since the decision was initially taken; on the other 
hand, when the contested decision of the administrative authority was one of revoking a 
person's request for asylum, then the judges seemed to be almost cynical, if not irritated, as for 
the need to even listen the case before them. 
 
On various occasions I have found myself standing for the second time before the very same 
judge who had previously overturned the administrative authority's decision to keep one of my 
clients in detention. This time, however, after an interval of no more than a few months 
between the two hearings, I had to argue against a later decision regarding the exact same 
client - this time to revoke her request for asylum.  A clear pattern emerged: while hearings 
regarding detention decisions tended to be long and were carefully conducted, resulting in 
verdicts which were always thoroughly reasoned, the procedures regarding a negative decision 
concerning an asylum request were rather hastily concluded, presenting time and again short 
verdicts, often lacking even sufficient references to the sheer facts of the case, and always 
ending by upholding the Ministry's decision. 
 
I believe that these occurrences demonstrate that Israeli judges do not have prejudice against 
foreign nationals appearing before them. It is fair to say that the Courts in Israel have always 
offered, by and large, protection to the individual against arbitrary or unlawful decisions taken 
by the state's authorities which caused the infringing of his or her rights. If my previous story 
tells us anything at all, it is that Israeli Judges are most likely to attribute decisive weight to 
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some fundamental rights of the individual, whether he/she is a citizen of the state or not. Such 
is the right to liberty, anchored in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and guaranteed to 
any person within the state of Israel. To the extent that the Court limits itself to considering the 
asylum seeker's right to liberty and its fulfillment only within and while staying in Israel, we 
can expect the Court to show no reluctance on its way to set aside an administrative decision to 
detain a person, and so to set him free, although such a decision is most likely to diminish the 
Court's popularity amongst the Israeli Jewish public. An impressive, and in a way even 
unprecedented, example of the Court's activist approach in regard the infringement of asylum 
seekers’ right to liberty was given recently when the High Court of Justice set aside, for the 
second time in two years, a piece of legislation, amendments no. 3 and 4 of the Prevention of 
Infiltrators Law, which allowed "infiltrators" to be held in detention for three years in the first 
case, and one year that can be prolonged for an undefined time, in an ‘open’ detention center 
in the later. As a result of the first decision, given by the court in 2013, 2,000 African asylum 
seekers were to be released within a short period of time. The first of the two decisions of the 
Court was so widely contested among the Israeli Jewish society that the Israeli parliament 
hastily passed another amendment to the law, which in turn was once again set aside in 
another highly unpopular ruling of the Court (the Court’s intervention in the third arrangement 
that was set forth in amendment no. 5 was more subtle – see chapter 4). 
 
I have already mentioned, these two decisions of the Israeli High Court of Justice are, in a 
way, unprecedented, not because of the annulment of the law 35 - though this is undoubtedly a 
rare outcome – but because it concerned a piece of legislation that was situated at the center of 
the current political debate, and that was supported by the vast majority of the political parties, 
whereas previous decisions of the Court to revoke some Knesset laws concerned mostly 'low 
profile' and to a certain extent even 'a-political' acts of legislation. That is to say, that when the 
basic right at stake is the right to liberty and its fulfillment within Israel, and even when the 
issue concerns asylum seekers' right to liberty, then the Court’s approach seems to perfectly fit 
with its image as an agent of liberal and democratic body of jurisprudence and its general 
'judicial daring'. 
 
At the same time, however, the High Court of Justice overlooks or at least refrains from 
deciding whether the administrative authority's policies’ real aim is to push asylum seekers to 
'voluntarily return' to their countries of origin, consequently putting at risk asylum seekers' 
right to liberty in their countries of origin, as well as their right to life and right to dignity in 
case they returned there. 
 
                                                                 
35 Since the enactment of the Basic Laws in 1992 and the consequently "Constitutional revolution" declared by the 
Supreme Court itself, enabling the Court to set aside Knesset laws which violate the rights asserted in the Basic 
Laws, the Court has already annulled several pieces of legislation, though only in some very rare occasions.   
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I will get back to these decisions of the High Court of Justice for further elaboration of the 
disparity between the Court's regular jurisprudence – which applies to just a limited aspect of 
its asylum adjudication, that is, the asylum seekers' right to liberty within and while they stay 
in Israel – and its jurisprudence relating to the most common asylum cases, where the risks 
posed on the asylum seekers' fundamental rights stem from the state's unwillingness to 
recognize any of them as refugees and thus to grant them adequate international protection.  
 
Having that said, one may already ponder regarding the apparent incompatibility between this 
approach of the Court on the one hand, and the inexistent rate of success at second instance on 
the other, that is, the virtually 0% recognition rate on appeal, which seems to clearly illustrate 
the Court’s 'particular' jurisprudence regarding asylum cases. And if we are to exclude a 
general prejudice of the Israeli Courts against foreigner nationals at large, then the question 
arises again: why is it that out of almost all other fields of law and types of cases36, it is only in 
respect to appeals against a negative decision on core asylum claims that the Courts radically 
abandon their regular body of jurisprudence, characterized by a strong activist and daring 
approach? 
 
At this point it is noteworthy to say a few words about the Israeli Court’s 'regular' 
jurisprudence, which has brought one prominent, and essentially critical, Israeli scholar to 
define the Israeli Courts as "rights-minded"37. Another influential Israeli scholar regards the 
Israeli Supreme Court as an "agent of liberal values" within Israeli society38. 
 
The notion of the Israeli judiciary as highly pro-active is tremendously widespread also on the 
international level; Richard Posner wrote that "what Barak (Israel Supreme Court's Chief 
Justice between the years 1995-2006) created out of whole cloth was a degree of judicial power 
undreamed of even by our most aggressive Supreme Court justices... In Barak's conception of 
the separation of powers, the judicial power is unlimited"39. 
 
That perception of the Israeli Supreme Court was strongly affirmed in a survey amongst 
comparative law scholars, who were asked to rank "the degree of judicial daring" of 14 
different national courts; the Israeli Court was found to be the "most daring" of all40. 
                                                                 
36 There is yet another type of cases to which the Courts apply a different judicial approach, characterized by a 
tendency toward omission to interfere in the administrative authority's decisions; these are the cases relating to 
the occupied territories, and I will get back to them and to the complex connection between them and cases 
relating to asylum claims.   
37D Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, State University of New York Press,2002; kretzmer's work on the 
Israeli Supreme Court's decisions relating to the occupied territories is a source of inspiration for my own work. 
His essential claim is that the Israeli Supreme Court has always offered a fair degree of protection to the 
Individual against arbitrary decisions of the state, performing a "rights-minded" approach, but only when it 
comes to "domestic-dispute", that is, disputes between the individual-citizen and the government agency.   
38M Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel, Oxford University Press, 2011  
39 R Posner, ‘Enlightened Despost’, The New Republic, April 23, 2007 
40 R Cooter and T Ginsburg, ‘Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models’, 16 int'l 
Rev L&Econ 295, 300, 1996 
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If this is indeed the Court’s ‘regular’ jurisprudence, then why does the Israeli judiciary 
abandon its activist approach and completely refrain from interfering in administrative 
decisions on asylum requests? – I believe that the explanation for this phenomenon – within 
the 'regular' jurisprudence of Israeli Courts and then also when compared to national Courts of 
other liberal democracies – exceeds the judicial dimension of administrative and international 
law, and may be found in the historical, psychological, cultural and political dimensions as 
they manifest themselves in the conductance of the Israeli judge. It seems to rely, above all, on 
the Israeli-Jewish public's collective memory of the Holocaust, and the way this memory is 
constantly being shaped and instrumentalized by the Israeli political establishment in order to 
justify some otherwise morally indefensible policies. More specifically, the notion of the 
Holocaust as a categorically unique atrocity, one that does not bear any comparison at all, and 
the rejection of any possible universal meaning of that catastrophe, is perceived to be a sort of 
explanation or legitimization for the unique behavior of Israel: a state which insists on being 
defined as a liberal democracy (‘the only democracy in the middle east’41) while exerting some 
very undemocratic and illiberal policies. 
 
Because the Israeli Jewish public denies the capacity of 'others' to authentically perceive its 
traumatic experience of the Holocaust - for only someone who has experienced the same or 
similar event can fully understand it– insisting on the categorical unique nature of the 
Holocaust leaves no room for the existence of any similar events, and renders any critical 
voice coming from the non-Jewish world illegitimate. 
 
In the following sections of this thesis, I would trace and define what seems to be a peculiar 
lacuna within the Israeli judge’s famous daring approach, a lacuna which may seem especially 
peculiar to the outsider viewer due to the historical trajectory drawn between the Jewish 
Holocaust, the establishment of the state of Israel as safe-haven for Jewish refugees, and the 
creation of the Refugee Convention in light of the Holocaust’s atrocities – a trajectory that 
should have suggested perhaps special affinity and sensitivity of Israeli judges towards 
contemporary asylum seekers. And so it does, but it yields exactly the opposite outcome one 
would expect when looking at the issue at hand through a “rational” (or merely a legal) prism. I 
would like to show that when it comes to the core question of recognizing contemporary 
asylum seekers as refugees, the Israeli judge suddenly breaks with that trajectory of humanism 
and compassion, with “history’s lesson learned”, and by refraining from recognizing any 
contemporary asylum seeker as refugee, she continues to indirectly constitute and maintain the 
hermetic distinction between any other atrocity and the Holocaust, “the genocide of 
                                                                 
41
‘ Israel’s ambassador to the UN: Israel is the Only Democracy in the Middle East’, israelnationalnews.com, 
19.3.2015 
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genocides”, and to reinforce the notion that only the victims of the Holocaust and nobody but 
them can ever be recognized as genuine refugee. 
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3. Uniquely Unique and Un-comparable: the Holocaust Framework 
  
3.1. The Case of Yafa Yarkoni, ‘the Singer of Wars’ 
 
During the 2002 Israeli military operation in the West Bank, which lasted for six weeks and 
was the largest one conducted in the occupied territories since the 1967 Six-Day War, a 
photograph appearing in the newspapers had captured the imagination of the 76 years old Yafa 
Yarkoni: it showed Israeli soldiers marking numbers with pencils on the arms of some 
handcuffed Palestinian men. It was published only a few days before Israel's Memorial Day 
and the following Independence-Day celebrations - probably the busiest time of the year for 
Yarkoni. Like every year, she was scheduled to open the Memorial Day sermon at her 
granddaughter's high school with one of her canonical songs, and she was also booked for a 
Memorial Day concert taking place in the Kfar Yona community center. Yarkoni, the winner 
of the 1998 Israel - Prize for Hebrew Song, known as "the singer of wars" due to her war-time 
performances for Israeli soldiers on the front lines, was asked also this year, for what has 
become to be an almost tradition for her, to give a short interview to Israel’s Army Radio on 
the eve of Memorial Day. Until that point, despite the general circumstances being those of an 
actual ongoing bloody–military operation, the coming together of the nation on the one hand, 
and of its 'gloria–nazionale' singer on the other, on that specific time of year, was almost 
normal. But it all changed at once when Yarkoni got on the air, and instead of just saying the 
much expected things, such as 'today my heart goes for the soldiers' and so on, she claimed to 
have no mood for “festivities” and after delivering an expansive critique of the Israeli-politics 
state of affairs, she added – 
 
"When I saw the Palestinians with their hands tied behind their backs, young men, I said 'it is 
like what they did to us in the Holocaust'…we are people who have been through the 
Holocaust, how can we be capable of doing such a things?"42 
 
During the first few hours after that interview Yarkoni had already received dozens of threat 
calls. The Military Radio station was of course bombarded with countless complaints from 
furious listeners. Subsequently, her scheduled performances for the next day – even the one at 
her granddaughter's high school - were both canceled. But soon it was not only a high school 
principal and a Mayor of a small town to determine the harsh exclusion of Yarkoni – at one 
time the artistic figure most identified with Israeli military and commemorative rituals - from 
the public sphere; they were soon joined by the Israeli Union for Performing Artists, which 
was not hesitant to call off the homage concert dedicated to Yarkoni herself on her 75th 
anniversary which was scheduled to take place only two weeks later. 
 
                                                                 
42  Y Klien,‘the Singer of Wars’ Against the War’, Haaretz, 2.5.2002 
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Noteworthy is the fact that Yarkoni had never before hesitated to publicly express her political 
stance against the ongoing occupation of the Palestinian Territories. If only she had restrained 
herself from denouncing solely the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian also now, probably no 
special reactions would have followed that interview. 
 
But what Yarkoni had said was absolutely unacceptable and simply had to be censored; 
Yarkoni disobeyed the social paradigm according to which “it’s forbidden to compare” the 
Holocaust to any other historical atrocity. It is true, Yarkoni did not only compare the 
Holocaust to just any historical event, but specifically to a much debated Israeli-operation in 
the territories it occupies for decades by now. And yet, given the Israeli hyper sensitivity for 
the subject matter, it seems fair to speculate that even had she compared the Holocaust to any 
other genocidal occurrence which is completely foreign to Israel’s current affairs, not even 
that and not even Yarkoni’s personal biography could have shielded her against the attacks 
that were aiming to silence her. 
 
Despite the fact that meanings at large are always comprehended through comparison, in the 
eyes of the Israeli-Jewish public the Holocaust seems to stand out as a unique historical event 
that does not endure any comparison whatsoever. This social ban on comparison regarding the 
Holocaust stems from, and at the same time, constitutes and reinforces the Israeli-Jewish 
public’s perception that the Holocaust is a categorically unique event. It seems to be an 
extreme expression of the perhaps faith (rather than just belief) in the Holocaust’s uniqueness, 
and a radical form of defending that ethos: By a-priori discarding the very comparability 
between the Holocaust and any possible historic event. 
 
Although the notion of the Holocaust’s uniqueness is still very much prevalent also outside of 
Israel and the Jewish-world, it was and still is being shaped and reshaped mainly by Israeli and 
Jewish political, educational and commemorative institutions, and first and foremost by Israeli 
and Jewish historians and holocaust scholars. 
 
Nowadays, scholars in these fields of studies who advance the Holocaust’s uniqueness 
argument anchor their premise mainly in the intent of Nazi-Germany to murder each and every 
single Jewish person, to fulfill the total annihilation of the whole Jewish people. The full claim 
is that such intention cannot be found in the doings or aspirations of any other genocidal 
perpetrator in modern-history, and that in the Nazi case the intent to do so was motivated 
solely by ideology, in a way that all the more proves the predominance of anti-Semitism 
within the broader Nazi ideology. According to the Intentionalist approach, this unprecedented 
intention cannot be attributed to the European settlers in relations the indigenous people of 
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America43, nor to the Turks vis-à-vis the Armenians44 - if to mention only the two most 
prominent, although unsuccessful, other candidates in the genocide recognition struggle.  
 
Following this claim comes a conclusion, that this distinctive feature alone, the allegedly 
unparalleled intention that stood behind the Nazi extermination of European Jewry, is 
sufficient enough to depict the Holocaust as ‘unique’ altogether. 
 
3.2. The Intellectual Struggle over the Holocaust’s Uniqueness  
 
However, the claim that the Holocaust’s uniqueness stems from the Nazis' intent to bring 
about a complete extermination upon the Jewish People, was not the first move of the 
uniqueness-thesis proponents; previous to some research developments and significant 
disclosures and revelations in respect to other claimed examples of genocide, they have first 
resorted to different criteria in order to establish the distinctiveness of the Holocaust and then 
to roughly mistake it for a sign of uniqueness45. 
 
With a new data available on the proportion of population extermination amongst the 
Gypsies46 or the Armenians47, it was already manifestly inaccurate to continue and claim that 
apart from European Jewry “no other people anywhere lost the main body of its population”, 
as one prominent defender of the uniqueness-concept had done before48. And with new facts 
revealed in the 1980s about the scope of destruction of indigenous Peoples in America, it was 
no longer “self-evident” that the total number of Jewish-Holocaust victims can be still used in 
order to support that claim about the unique nature of the Holocaust. 
 
David Stannard, perhaps the most eminent critic of the uniqueness-thesis and its devastating 
political consequences, examines how, when the quantitative criterion has already failed to 
prove the premise about the unique nature of the Holocaust, defendants of that very claim 
went further on to exhaust different sorts of criteria before they had to approach, as a last 
resort, the issue of the intent behind the Nazi genocidal machinery49. The speed with which 
death reached the Holocaust Jewish victims; the distinction between the means of destruction 
employed by the Nazi and by other genocidal perpetrators - these and other fairly-arbitrary 
criteria upon which they had first claimed to establish the unique nature of the Holocaust were 
                                                                 
43 S T Katz, ‘The “Unique” Intentionality of the Holocaust’, Oxford University Press, 1981 
44 M R Marrus, ‘The Holocaust in History’, Brandeis University Press and University Press of New England, 
1987;Y Bauer, ‘Whose Holocaust?’, Midstream 26(9), November 1980 
45 D E Stannard, ‘Uniqueness as Denial: The Politics of Genocide Scholarship’, in Is the Holocaust Unique?, ed.  
A S Rosenbaum, Westview Press, 1996, p. 183 
46 I Hancock, ‘Uniqueness of the Victims: Gypsies, Jews, and the Holocaust’, Without Prejudice: The EAFORD 
International Review of Racial Discrimination 1(2), 1988, p. 45-67 
47 R G Hovannisian, ‘Etiology and Sequence of the Armenian Genocide’, in Genocide: Conceptual and Historical 
Dimension, ed. G J Andreopoulos, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994 
48 L Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians, Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 12 
49 Stannard,  p. 171 
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all more or less abandoned by the uniqueness advocates as they too failed to prove their 
essential premise. 
 
Of course, there is nothing wrong in pursuing a strong intuition in research, but the persistence 
with which the proponents of the uniqueness argument have skipped from one stance to 
another, and their overwhelming antagonism towards anyone who wishes to challenge them50, 
may altogether depict their essential claim as nothing more than a presupposition that lays at 
the center of an organized crusade rather than an honest intellectual attempt to genuinely prove 
a research-hypothesis. 
 
While most advocates of the Holocaust’s uniqueness have shifted their attention to the issue of 
the intent behind the Nazi extermination of European –Jewry, their opponents did not always 
restrict themselves to dispute only the accuracy of that ever more central argument, but also 
increasingly engaged in an attempt to contest the validity of the very concept of uniqueness 
itself within the field of history studies. 
 
As for the claim itself about the unparalleled intent of the Nazis to kill all the Jews – not just 
within Europe but everywhere - some historians had pointed out the lack of sufficient 
documentary evidence to establish that specific claim51, or the fact that such documentary 
evidence indeed does exist, but in regard to the Europeans settlers’ intent to exterminate some 
whole groups of Native Americans52. According to Stannard, Jewish advocates of the 
uniqueness thesis simply ignore the culmination of such documentary evidence in respect to 
the English settlers’ intent in a way that corresponds to the consistent Euro-American 
indifference or denial of the Native American Peoples’ Holocaust. 
 
Even if we accept the premise that of all genocidal victim-groups only the Jews alone were 
singled out for total extermination, the actual outcomes of at least two comparable genocidal 
projects should raise the “question of whether a failed intent to kill all the members of a given 
group – as in the case of the Nazis and the Jews – is truly more notable than the successful 
extermination of an entire people”53. 
 
Although intentionalists often do seem to acknowledge the “tragedy” of the Indigenous 
peoples, that is, the radical destruction that European settlers have brought upon them54, they 
refuse to attribute it to any premeditated, intentional-genocidal act by the European settlers, 
                                                                 
50Attribution of anti-Semitic motives to the critics of the uniqueness thesis, and various attempts to delegitimize 
them are wide spread :D E Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and memory, Plume, 
1994, chapter 11; G D Rosenfeld, ‘The Politics of Uniqueness: Reflections on the Recent Polemical Turn in 
Holocaust and Genocide Scholarship’, pp. 42  
51 Rosenfeld, p.43 
52 Stannard, p. 184 
53Ibid., p.185 
54 Katz,  p.168 
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for the extermination of the Native- peoples of America was allegedly only the consequence of 
‘natural phenomena’ such as disease and hunger. While Stannard points out the fact that also 
many Jews have perished, inter alia, due to diseases or starvation, and so not only by direct 
agent violence, and yet, of course, they are still considered to be “holocaust victims”, others 
suggested that by employing a completely different conception of intention – one which 
includes reckless conduct or indifference towards the foreseeable consequence of an action - 
the intention to bring about destruction upon the native people of America can surely be 
attributed then to the European settlers of America, just as much as to the Nazis in relation to 
their Jewish victims55. 
 
What I was trying to outline through these exemplas, is that the Holocaust’s uniqueness 
advocates were always ready to employ some new criterion in order to establish some 
distinctive trait of the Holocaust that would supposedly render it “unique”, as their opponents 
become more and more aware and keen to expose the arbitrariness of those criteria or their 
possible applicability not only in regard to the Holocaust alone but also when you care to think 
of all the overshadowed and usually-unconsidered claimed exemplas of genocide and mass 
murder56. Moreover, some critics of the uniqueness concept point out the arbitrariness of this 
very concept when it is being implemented in historical studies, its futileness in this theoretical 
context and its inevitable devastating political consequences of inflicted indifference or 
absolute denial in regard to other examples of genocide. 
 
According to Stannard, the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide or the genocide against the 
Gypsies do not differ from each other in terms of any of them being somewhat more unique 
than the others. Each of them is inevitably unique by its historical nature, “for no two events, 
even though they commonly may be acknowledged to fall within a single large classification, 
are ever precisely alike57”.The manner in which scholars who promote the uniqueness 
argument diverge from the regular treatment given by historians to any major historical event, 
is exemplified by the general category of the definition of “Revolution’. The French, Russian 
or Chinese revolutions all retain different characteristics, which may or may not attract 
different degree of attention from different scholars, but nonetheless no one particular aspect 
of these major historical events would potentially mark any of them as more particular than the 
others nor would any historian be tempted to define one of them as the truly “unique” 
revolution. It seems solid to say that any historian, whether those or other examples of 
                                                                 
55 W Churchill, ‘Genocide: toward a functional definition’, Alternatives, vol.11, 1986, p. 413; A D Moses, 
‘Conceptual blockages and definitional dilemmas in the ‘racial century’: genocides of indigenous people and the 
Holocaust’, Pattern of Prejudice, Institution for Jewish Policy Research, vol. 36, no. 4, 2002, pp. 29 
56 Stannard elaborates this point time and again: “In fact, the entire process of seeking grounds for Jewish victim 
uniqueness is one of smoke and mirrors… If, however, critics point out after a time that those experiences are not 
in fact unique, other allegedly unique experiences are invented and proclaimed” - p.190; And so goes Moses: “… 
it is to note in this field of inquiry that group trauma is acted out in truculently held intellectual positions whose 
articulators are prepared to climb out on very thin limbs to make their cases” - p.16 
57 Stannard, p.191 
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revolution are of more interest for his or her work, would agree that all of the abovementioned 
major historical events “have been revolutions”.  
 
Daniel Blatman also points out what is so apparent, that is that every historical event is as 
unique as the next one, and so that by upholding one event categorically unique, to the extent 
that it would not bare a comparison to any other, we are being led “to a metaphysical notion of 
history and turns it into a collection of narrative anecdotes, a series of events devoid of context 
and universal meaning”58. 
 
Similarly, Moses stresses out the metaphysical quality of the inquiry into the meanings of 
differences and similarities between historical events, proclaiming that it is rather a political 
and philosophical task, not a historical one. He states that – 
 
“Uniqueness is not a useful category for historical research; it is a religious or metaphysical 
category…”59 
 
According to Dan Stone, the “uniqueness policy” expresses an ideological stance, with the aim 
of advancing the perception of the Holocaust as containing sacred historical significance. He 
also locates the intellectual struggle over the uniqueness of the Holocaust within the ethical or 
commemorative sphere rather than in the field of history studies60. 
 
Even Gavriel Rosenfeld, who seems to understand, and to a certain extent to even justify the 
appeal being made for the uniqueness concept, questions the utility of that concept given not 
only its linguistic ambiguity, but also the different analytical approaches in which it is rooted, 
especially because of its ever increasing connotation to moral judgment. He concludes – 
“Given the drawbacks of uniqueness, might the concept not be replaced by a less attention-
grabbing but more precise term…?”61 
 
Up to now, none of those highly energetic defenders of the uniqueness concept have ever 
made any attempt to confront the essential claim that that concept itself - even before we go 
deeper into critical examination of its political and moral consequences in the context of 
genocide studies - is above all foreign to their field of research. Why is it, then, that 
notwithstanding those serious concerns regarding its possible applicability to historical - 
research, the concept of uniqueness remains right at the center of Holocaust scholarship ,and, 
inter alia, of genocide – studies altogether? Some critics of the uniqueness concept suggest that 
                                                                 
58 D Blatman, ‘Holocaust Scholarship: Towards a Post-Uniqueness Era’, Journal of Genocide Research, 2015, p. 
22 
59 Moses, p.18 
60 D Stone, ‘The historiography of Genocide: Beyond “Uniqueness” and Ethnic Competition’, Rethinking 
History, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2004, p. 129 
61 G D Rosenfeld, ‘The Politics of Uniqueness: Reflections on the Recent Polemical Turn in Holocaust and 
Genocide Scholarship ‘, Holocaust and Genocide studies, V13, 1999, p.48 
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the answer lies in the political concerns of the concept's defenders or in the empowerment of 
the victim-group to which they belong. 
 
According to Stannard, the two major beneficiaries from the advancement of the uniqueness 
concept in genocide studies are Euro-American nations on the one hand62, and the state of 
Israel on the other. Bearing in mind various examples of overshadowed unconsidered - 
genocides, and above all- as he seems to see it- that of the native people of the Americas, he 
says: 
 
“… The notion of the uniqueness and the incomparability of the Jew’s genocidal suffering is 
the concomitant trivialization or even outright denial of the genocidal suffering of others….”63 
 
If indeed the inevitable consequence of the uniqueness-concept in the context of genocide – 
studies is the denial of the “American Holocaust”, for example, then to accept and promote the 
uniqueness claim seems to perfectly suit the Americans’ wish not to confront their own past as 
genocidal perpetrators. 
 
Regarding world-Jewry and the state of Israel, their effort to establish a unique type of 
historical persecution and suffering, which is shared by the Jews alone, seems to strongly 
resonate the Jewish people’s self-perception as the ‘The Chosen People’, both augmenting to 
its fullest the ‘moral capital’ that a genocidal victim- group may ever gain. And so, in order to 
justify its territorial expansionism and the occupation regime it has brought upon the 
Palestinian people, Israel is advancing the self - perception of being home to the ‘chosen 
people’ and at the same time tries to maximize the inflicted moral-capital by applying the 
exact same idea, the one of Jews being ‘elected people’, only now in the morbid context of the 
exclusive persecution and unparalleled suffering experienced by that ‘chosen people’ alone. 
As Zygmunt Bauman puts it, Israel uses the Holocaust “as the certificate of its political 
legitimacy, a safe-conduct pass for its past and future policies, and above all as the advance 
payment for the injustices it might itself commit. “64 
 
Moses explains the devotion of some Jewish-scholars to the idea of the Holocaust’s 
uniqueness, by pointing out the centrality of that traumatic event within their own personal 
identity. The Holocaust serves as a key pillar both of personal and collective Jewish - identity, 
and by many Jews it is perceived to be sacred; that shared sense of sacredness, according to 
Moses, is fundamental for the creation and maintenance of a group identity. Since the 
attribution of sacredness to the Holocaust is vastly based on its alleged uniqueness, any 
                                                                 
62 Moses also points out that “…for most American public leaders and intellectuals are happy to pontificate about 
genocide in every country but their own” - Moses, p.16 
63 Stannard, p. 194 
64 Z Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press, 2001, p.ix. 
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attempt to undermine that premise of uniqueness is also a threat to the group's identity at large. 
And so, scholars like Kats and Bauer, who place the Holocaust at the heart of Jewish 
experience, would be essentially betraying their own personal identity if they were not 
insisting as vehemently as they do on the unique nature of the Holocaust65 (In the forth chapter, 
where I examine the figurative language of the Israeli judges, we’ll see how they habitually 
tend to make allusions to the Holocaust as being a sacred event). 
 
In my view, it is indeed quite notable that within the framework of the academic struggle over 
the question of the Holocaust’s uniqueness, most of that perception’s defenders come either 
from Jewish-diaspora or the Israeli academy, who then at least for the reasons given by Moses 
should be suspected of having a personal motivation to advance and support that perception66. 
It is all the more true when their apparent agenda to establish by hook or by crook the unique 
nature of the Holocaust – and so to de-facto disqualify all the ‘un-unique’ claimed genocides 
who dare apply for that desired title - is perfectly in line with the Israeli political 
establishment's consistent stance against recognition of any other claimed genocide, well 
established as it may be in terms of recognized historical research67. 
 
What we see here, then, is mainly Jewish and Israeli scholars who persistently advance and 
ferociously defend the contentious Holocaust’s uniqueness thesis; their agenda seems to be 
dubiously compatible with the political expressions of that very thesis as it is enacted by the 
state of Israel. The state's active role in the international attempt to deny the Armenian 
Genocide, is only one amongst many ways in which the State tries, and in my view succeeds, 
to exploit the Holocaust to its fullest. To complete the picture come museums and 
commemorative bodies in Israel and around the world, alongside Jewish communities and 
                                                                 
65 Moses, p.13 
66 Stannard claims that the uniqueness argument was always advanced by a handful of Jewish scholars, whom due 
to their research methods he defines as “something of a cult within that scholarly community”. He does note, 
though, that these scholars do not represent the whole of Jewish scholarship on the subject matter – Stannard, p. 
167, 192; See also, D Gutwein, ‘The Privatization of The Holocaust: Memory, Historiography, and Politics’, 
Indiana University Press, 2009, p.45  
67 Twenty Three countries have already formally recognized the Armenian genocide; Israel and the United states 
are not among them. The most notable political attempt to bring about a sort of official Israeli recognition of the 
Armenian genocide was carried out by Yossi Sarid, who served as the Israeli education minister; his call for an 
official Israeli recognition of the Armenian genocide, and for its inclusion in the education system’s texts-books, 
was rejected by the prime minister at the time, Ehud Barak – see :Y Sarid, ‘you finally remember now?’, 
Ha'aretz, 21.01.2010;  Israel has also tried, in collaboration with the Turkish government, to prevent the united 
states from establishing an official memorial day for the Armenian genocide – in Stannard, p.196 ;see also: Y 
Klein Halevi, ‘The Forgotten Genocide’, Jerusalem Report 6(2), 1995, p. 20-21 . The Americans’ constant position 
not to acknowledge the Armenian genocide seems to prove the claim that the American political establishment 
benefits from the denial of other examples of genocide alongside the ‘American Holocaust’, and that the 
contribution of the uniqueness argument to the denial process of any genocides other than the Jewish one, is the 
reason why the American academy and its political establishment ally with Jewish scholars and Israeli officials in 
order to preserve the notion of the Holocaust's uniqueness. The shifts in the position of president Barack Obama, 
who as a presidential candidate has described the Armenian tragedy as a ‘genocide’ and proclaimed that the 
United States has the moral responsibility to recognize it as such, is all the more revealing; Since he took office 
Obama stopped calling the Armenian massacre a genocide, and he has abandoned his promise to officially 
recognize it as such if elected – ‘Barack Obama Will Not Label 1915 Massacre of Armenians a Genocide’, The 
Guardian, 22.4.2015. It is all the more disturbing when you read President Obama's cryptic statement on 
Armenian Remembrance Day, with its implicit message that the president still believes the Armenian tragedy 
was indeed genocide, but he simply cannot say so – see: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offi.  
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other stake-holders, who join their efforts for the construction and the maintenance of a 
hermetic distinction between the Holocaust and any other genocidal historical event68. 
 
For the unfortunate candidates - competitors in the monopolized field of genocide-recognition, 
putting it all together means the denial of their tragedy, and inter alia their deprivation of the 
international community’s interest and sensitivity regarding their special needs and demands. 
 
For Israel, however, regardless of its apparent indifference towards the additional pain being 
caused to any other victim-group but her, the hegemonic- Eurocentric perception of the 
Holocaust’s uniqueness means exactly the opposite: it signifies the monopolistic ownership 
over the entire ‘moral capital’ driving the industry of genocides-recognition. 
 
Throughout the writings of both proponents and opponents of the uniqueness thesis, one might 
get the impression that everybody who is involved in that contentious - debate perceives the 
potential ‘moral capital’ as somewhat undividable, as if it could not be conferred upon more 
than only one genocidal victim - group69. It is hard to determine whether at first it was Israel, 
alongside Jewish and Euro-American interested actors, who regulated and structured, for the 
abovementioned reasons, the academic and political recognition- practices to result in what 
appears to be a zero-sum game. On the one hand, we do see some solid evident to prove such 
an attempt by the actors who are closely associated with the Jewish and Euro-American world. 
But on the other hand, there are also similar attempts being made now by their rivals, who in 
their turn claim for the exact same thing – the uniqueness, or the ‘special’ or ‘real’ quality – 
but this time regarding the genocides that were conducted against the competing victim-
groups to whom this scholars relate70. This unfortunate move of some critics to the 
uniqueness-thesis raises the question whether they are merely pushed to accept the codes and 
regulations of the ‘game’ as they were previously determined by the predominant players in 
that field, or whether possessiveness is an inherent driving factor with equal hold on each and 
                                                                 
68 Blatman writes about the contribution of Yad Vashem, Israel’s official memorial institution to the Holocaust’s 
victims, to the maintenance of the uniqueness thesis: “The decades in which Holocaust studies were deeply 
rooted in the uniqueness paradigm, and the centrality of Yad Vashem in maintaining and perpetuating this 
message, make it difficult for new approaches to emerge” – Blatman, ‘Holocaust Scholarship: Toward a Post 
Uniqueness Era’, pp. 38; See also, A Goldberg, ‘The “Jewish narrative” in the Yad Vashem global Holocaust 
museum’, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 14, No.2, 2012, pp. 187-213; and Moses presents the struggle 
between Jewish communities and other exiled victim-groups living in Canada over the commemorative 
expression of uniqueness-agenda – D Moses, ‘The Canadian Museum For Human Rights: the ‘uniqueness of the 
Holocaust’ and the question of genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research, 14(2), 2012, p.215-238.    
69We have, on the one hand, the advocates of the Holocaust’s uniqueness thesis, such as Bauer, who claims that  
other victim groups are “stealing the Holocaust from us… we need to regain our sense of sacredness”, quoted in 
R G L Waite, ‘The Holocaust and Historical explanation’, in I Wallimann and M N Dobkowski (eds) , Genocide 
and the Modern Age, Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 169;on the other hand, there are critics of the uniqueness thesis, 
who according to their political concerns wish to redistribute the moral capital and to invest it in different victim 
group.  Ward Churchill, for example, aims to confer upon the American Indians “every ounce of moral authority 
we can get”, Churcill, A Little Matter of Genocide, p. 11. The struggle over the attribution of the ‘moral capital’ is 
best encapsulated in Irving Louis Horowits’s expression – “moral bookkeeping” – see: ‘Genocide and the 
Reconstruction of Social Theory: Observations on the Exclusivity of Collective Death’, in Wallimann and 
Dobkowski, Genocide and the Modern Age, p. 62.   
70 “The American holocaust was and remains unparalleled, both in terms of its magnitude and the degree to which 
its goals were met…” Churchill, A Little Matter of Genocide, p.4 
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every victim-group, irrespective of the positions and actions taken before by others.  Either 
way, it is hard to deny that at least in practice the struggle for recognition between different 
victim–groups is still indisputably governed by those propagating the uniqueness of the Jewish 
genocide.  
 
This expansive survey of the opposing views and arguments regarding the uniqueness of the 
Holocaust was meant to form an analogy between the driving forces - the political, 
sociological and psychological ones – motivating the creation and maintenance of the 
uniqueness thesis, first on the international level and then within the Israeli-Jewish society. 
What seems to be missing within the Israeli domestic sphere is a challenging position to the 
hegemonic perception about the Holocaust's uniqueness, and the absence of such a 
confrontation generates an even more rigid presupposition about the Holocaust’s uniqueness - 
which does not entail possibility to conduct any comparison at all between the Holocaust and 
other claimed genocidal occurrences. The story of Yafa Yarkony was meant to exemplify the 
extreme intolerance within the Israeli-Jewish public towards any attempt of comparing the 
Holocaust - or even of using it as an open analogy - to past or contemporary historical events. 
 
It is rather obvious, then, that the uniqueness thesis is at least as prevalent within the Israeli-
Jewish society as it is in the international arena, but in my view the political aim and 
consequences of that paradigm are quite different in the narrow Israeli context; I wish to argue 
that while the advancement of the uniqueness thesis at the international level intends to gain 
the entire ‘moral capital’ for only one victim-group - that of the Jews - and for the state of that 
people, Israel, the creation and maintenance of the uniqueness - thesis within the Israeli-
society has a different political aim: to constitute and to preserve the conviction of Israeli-
Jews about the inability of ‘others’ to judge their actions in an accurate and fair manner. 
 
In the Israeli context, depicting the Holocaust as a categorically- unique historical event is 
tantamount to the exclusion from the debate over its conducts of any critical voice coming 
from outside of the Jewish-world. Richard I. Cohen’s observation regarding the response of 
Jews from Germany to the controversial claims of Hanna Arendt – who was Jewish but lacked 
the personal experience of the Holocaust as she was fortunate enough to flee Europe in time – 
is many times more telling if examined vis-à-vis the attitude of the Israeli-Jewish society 
towards goyim (a somewhat derogatory word for Gentiles used in Israel). According to Cohen, 
the de-legitimization of Arendt by Jews from Germany – 
 
“… Sheds light on a characteristic attitude of individuals who have undergone a major trauma 
and whose identity has become deeply intertwined with that experience. They deny the 
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outsider’s ability to penetrate authentically into their experience, perceiving that only someone 
who has experienced a similar event can reach the depths of true understanding”71. 
 
Following Cohen, I suggest that for the Israeli-Jewish society, anyone who has not 
experienced The Holocaust72 cannot authentically understand and, inter alia, judge, the alleged 
acute needs and motives which stand behind Israel’s conducts - its expansionistic politics and 
its ever growing appetite for militaristic power. Many different versions of self-justification on 
the one hand, and de-legitimization of Israel’s critics on the other, are drawing upon the 
presumption that only Jewish people and the Jewish-state can truly understand the 
extraordinary - eternal  threats upon them, and consequently that only they alone can 
determine for themselves what measures are to be taken in confronting such threats. 
 
And so, if indeed a personal or collective experience similar to the Holocaust is a precondition 
for a critical view of Israel to be considered as legitimate, then the hegemonic social rule 
according to which it is forbidden to even compare the Holocaust to other historical events 
serves as an obstacle for such similar events to be found at all. Consequently, obeying this rule 
means also shielding Israel from ‘outsiders’’ critique, since such a stance stages an impassable 
barrier on anyone’s attempt to be admitted into the imaginary-community of Holocaust and 
possible ‘Holocaust-like’ victims, and so renders the outsiders’ critique inherently illegitimate. 
 
When it comes to asylum adjudication, the Israeli judges’ performance - which is best 
described as a bias in favor of omission rather than their regular juridical tendency toward 
intervention in administrative decisions - seems to encapsulate the very motives that stand 
beyond the advancement of the uniqueness thesis by scholars, commemorative-bodies, 
communities and state-organs which directly belong or are intimately associated with the 
Jewish-world and the state of Israel. 
 
                                                                 
71 R I Cohen, ‘A Generation’s Response to Eichmann in Jerusalem’, in S E Aschheim (ed), Hannah Arendt in 
Jerusalem, University of California Press, 2001, p.261 
72 Jewish Israelis don’t tend to make any distinction between themselves and their ancestries, who have indeed 
personally experienced the horrors of the Holocaust. The memory of the Holocaust in Israel is ever more present, 
and it is being constructed and shaped in a way that indulge Israelis in the imagining of themselves as the direct 
heirs of the Holocaust’ victims.  Representations of the Holocaust in Israel tend to blur the distinction between 
the reality of the events themselves and their commemorative expressions. Pilgrimage of High School children to 
the death camps contributes immensely to this confusion: “This confusion is most striking in the case of 
memorials located at the sites of destruction, where a sense of authentic place tends to invite visitors not only to 
mistake their reality for the actual death-camps’ reality but also to confuse and implicit, monumentalized vision 
for unmediated history…Nothing but airy time seems to mediate between the visitor and past realities, which are 
not merely re-presented by these artifacts but present in them. For as literal fragments of events, these ruins tend 
to collapse the distinction between themselves and the memory of events they would evoke.” – see: J E Young, 
‘The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memories and Meaning’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 4, No.1, 
1989, p.64. On Israeli-politicians’ allusions for the continuum between Holocaust-victims and Jewish Israelis on 
the one hand, and the Nazi-perpetrators and the Palestinians on the other, see I Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and the 
Politics of Nationhood, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 109, 112, 114, 120, 195, 197. See also – D Gavriely –
Nuri, ‘Collective Memory as a Metaphor: The Case of Speeches by Israeli Prime Ministers 2001-2009’, Memory 
Studies, vol.7(1), 2014.    
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Judges in a democracy are supposed to act independently of other branches of the 
government; their decisions shouldn’t be dictated by other organs of the State. And yet, Courts 
“are part of the machinery of authority within the State and as such cannot avoid the making of 
political decisions. Judges may be independent, but they are not neutral”73. 
 
Israeli - judges’ reluctance to recognize contemporary asylum-seeker as refugees stems from 
the same sociological, psychological and political motives that I have mentioned before in 
relation to the defenders of the uniqueness thesis and their refusal to recognize the members of 
any other trauma-group as genocidal victims. But the Israeli judges’ target audience is 
different than that of other Israeli and Jewish institutions which are invested in the furtherance 
of the uniqueness thesis; while the other actors stage constraints on various victim-groups 
seeking international - recognition of their trauma, in order to confer the entire moral-capital 
upon Jews and the Jewish-state, the aim of the Israeli- judges’ bias - conscious or not - against 
the recognition of contemporary asylum seeker as refugees, is meant to influence the Israeli-
Jewish society rather than the international community. Their bias against the recognition of 
contemporary asylum seekers as refugees reinforce the fundamental perception within the 
Israeli-Jewish society, that no other people but the Jewish People has ever experienced 
anything similar to the Holocaust, and, inter alia, can ever make a judgment about Israel’s 
considerations and conducts. 
 
My essential claim is that when Israeli-judges apply the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 
implications of their discretion transcend dramatically beyond the narrow scope of the 
individual asylum seekers’ faith; their bias against the recognition as refugees of 
contemporary asylum seekers aims at and results in the reinforcement of the Israeli world-
view that nobody is in the position of judging the Jewish – state. To put it differently - if, for 
example, Eritreans were to be recognized as refugees, then those Eritreans would also be in a 
position to make a judgment over Israel’s policies, for they too have experienced a trauma 
similar to that of the Jewish - Holocaust. It is quite obvious that a hypothetical critical position, 
if taken by Eritrean or Sudanese communities, would not be a major concern for Israel. But it 
is almost a matter of principle: in a somewhat similar fashion to the overall prohibition of all 
comparison, rather than only dealing with some possible undesirable findings that may or may 
not come out of such comparison, no one should be ever empowered to ‘have a say’ on Israeli 
matters under the implicit recognition that they too belong to the imaginary community of 
people who has suffered a Holocaust-like event. 
 
Now, I’m perfectly aware of the fact that an entitlement to refugee status under the convention 
has nothing to do with one’s being on the run specifically from a genocidal perpetrator; but the 
convention does evoke the memory of the Holocaust, and its application by the Israeli-judges 
                                                                 
73 Kretzmer, p.191   
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connotes a preliminary appeal to the Holocaust and a consequent comparison with it. The 
Refugee Convention, according to the conventional wisdom, was enacted as a result of the 
international community’s failure in protecting (mainly) Jewish-refugees from the Nazi-
genocidal machinery. It was meant to prevent similar episodes from happening. Due to the 
historical context of its enactment (on which I elaborate in the next chapter), the convention 
seems to invite the Israeli judge to render the signifier ‘refugee’ as having the specific Jewish-
refugee as its ‘signified’74 ,rather than any other faceless person who may face ‘only’ a (‘un-
unique’) persecution on one of the grounds proclaimed in the convention. 
 
Taken all that’s been said so far regarding the massive propagation of that unique identity – 
preserved, reenacted and propagated by the state and its organs – and in light of the statistical 
and verbal facts that are and will be presented in this thesis, it wouldn’t be too far-fetched in 
my opinion to assume that when the Israeli judge adjudicates asylum-appeals, and she closes 
her eyes, what immediately pops up in her mind is the prototypical-Jewish refugee, and only 
him. The appearance of that prototypical- refugee is so compelling to her for reasons that go 
beyond the sheer connotation between the convention and the Holocaust .The convention, 
however, can alone evoke the Israeli judge’s self-perception of being a direct heir to the proto-
refugees, not to mention to victimhood itself – a self-perception which is the stone and marble 
cement for the creation of her personal identity, as much as for the construction of a group 
identity for the Jews and the Israeli Jews. The uniqueness of that exclusive victimhood renders 
it altogether sacred, and so entails its function as an effective delineating tool between Jews 
and gentiles. But there is something else that goes even further beyond the judge’s obvious 
interest in the preservation of the Holocaust’ sacredness; Our judge is so colonized by that 
personal identity of the categorically unique victim that she is simply incapable of opening 
herself to the unfamiliar, to the visits of others - to imagining their expectations and fears, 
which are being dictated by different life experiences and standpoints than hers75. 
 
Now, let’s keep the (ethical) encounter between the Israeli judge and the contemporary asylum 
seeker present in our mind while we read the follow passage from Judith Butler - her take on 
the Levinasian term - ‘the demand of the Other’: 
 
“If the ethical demand arrives from the past, precisely as a “resource” for me in the present – a 
massage from an ancient text, a traditional practice that illuminates the present in some way, 
or might dispose me toward certain modes of conduct in the present – it can only be “taken up” 
or “received” by being “translated” into present terms. Receptivity is always a matter of 
                                                                 
74F  D Saussure, Writing in General Linguistics, Oxford University Press, 2008  
75 J Han, Conference Re-cap: Truth & Identity – www.hannaharendtcenter.org/p=2501; See also – H Arendt, 
Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, University of Chicago Press, 1989, p.43; I Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and 
the Politics of Nationhood, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.135  
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translation… the “message” changes in the course of the transfer from one spatiotemporal 
horizon to another. 
**** 
If we understand the way we gain access to an original set of demands or injunction as a 
translation, then this access does not take place through a historical return to the time and 
place of the original, which is, in any case, impossible. On the contrary, we can only turn to 
what translation makes available to us, brings forth, illuminates within the present. In this way 
the loss of the original is the condition of the survival of a certain “demand” relayed through 
language and across time”76. 
 
The resonance of abovementioned historical, sociological, psychological and political ethics 
projecting on the Israeli-judge’s mind; the continuum of the past into present life in Israeli 
society  -  these make it impossible for the Israeli judge to simply ‘lose the original’ in order to 
enable an ‘opening to the unfamiliar’; the original demand of the proto-refugee (‘protect me 
from Auschwits’) does not disappear when the contemporary asylum-seeker makes her 
demand (‘protect me from persecution on the grounds stated in the convention’); It clashes 
with the present demand and renders its receptivity practically impossible. The contemporary 
asylum seeker appearing before the judge - never quite the same like the proto-refugee who 
fled Auschwits – cannot pass for a ‘real’, ‘true’, refugee; her demand cannot be properly 
received by the Israeli-judge, who is looking to see in her the proto-refugee from a past time 
and place. Thus, the Eritrean or Sudanese asylum-seeker is destined to be discarded by the 
Israeli-judge. Her demand will never correspond with the original demand of the proto-
refugee, whose translation will inevitably result in the labeling of the asylum-seeker as a 
migrant worker, never a genuine refugee. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                 
76 J Butler, Parting Ways, Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism, Columbia University Press, 2014, p. 10-13 
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4. The Jewish Context of the Refugee Convention – a Nexus Between the 
Holocaust and Contemporary Asylum Issues? 
 
Israel had signed the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees already on the 1st of 
August 1951, immediately upon the closure of the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries. 
Despite the pleas that were later made – both by its own representative to the conference and 
by the High Commissioner for refugees - for Israel to be among the first six countries to ratify 
the convention77, it actually took the Israeli government three more years to conclude the 
ratification process, eventually making Israel only the tenth state to deposit its instrument of 
ratification. The state of Israel never actually transposed the convention into its domestic 
legislation, which nevertheless doesn’t mean that Israel is not bound by the convention’s 
provisions. 
  
On the international level, Israel is bound by the Convention according to article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 196978 (“Pacta sunt servanda”). The Convention 
also binds Israel by its domestic law: According to the presumption of conformity between 
international –law (contractual and customary) and Israeli-national law, the latter should be 
interpreted in light of Israel’s obligations to international law79. 
 
Although Israel’s compliance with the Convention’s provisions may be seriously doubted, no 
one claims that it is not legally bound by it, not even the Ministry of Interior. Israeli judges 
routinely make recourse to the Convention when they adjudicate asylum-appeals. Now, given 
the legal outcomes of their interpretation and implementation of the convention - that is, that 
no present day asylum-seeker is ever to be found eligible for the refugee status under it - I 
would suggest that an inquiry into the Convention’s Jewish context may shed some light on 
the subtle reasons for which Israeli judges apparently delineate the legal subject ‘refugee’ 
under the Convention, in a rather exclusionary manner.     
 
In other words, the fact that the Minister of Interior and the Israeli judges - both the executive 
branch and the Courts - consistently find that the Refugee Convention applies to virtually no 
present day asylum-seeker, can be explained in respect to the strong connotation between the 
Refugee Convention and the Holocaust, a connotation which generates the ghostly  
appearance of the "proto-refugee" (the Jewish-Holocaust victim/ survivor) right in front of  the 
Israeli judge's eyes; in her eye's mind, the phantom of this proto-refugee accompanies every 
contemporary appellant-asylum seeker, undermining her claim of being a "refugee in her own 
                                                                 
77 According to article 43(1), the convention was to enter into force ninety days after six states deposited their 
instruments of ratification.  
78 Although Israel has never acceded to the Vienna Convention, its provisions are considered to be a customary 
international law – see A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practices, Cambridge, N.Y, Cambridge University Press, 
2000, p.11 
79 It means that only when the wording of the law or its specific purpose don’t fit with the international norm, then 
and only then the Israeli law would be interpreted as if it contradicts the provisions of an international treaty to 
which Israel is a signature party – see: HCJ 2599/00 Yated v. The Ministry of Education (14.8.2002)   
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right" with its particular refugee-hood and the extreme intensity of that ‘unique’ form of  
persecution that only that Jewish proto-refugee has ever had to endure. The culmination of the 
suffering and fears of that proto-refugee is de facto the one and only real standard for being 
recognized as a ‘genuine’ refugee, notwithstanding the legal fact that the Convention itself 
does not contain such a standard, but rather much more general and broad ones. 
    
So in what way does the Refugee Convention connote the Jewish Holocaust and Jewish-
refugees, at least in the eyes of the Israeli judge? According to one commentator on the 
Convention’s definition of Refugee, its formulation was undoubtedly influenced by the 
“particular forms of persecution that had been witnessed during the Nazi regime in 
Germany.”80 K Walker argues that already during some early attempts81 to constitute and 
further a refugee protection regime, what was basically created is “a definition of refugee that 
expressly referred to threats to life or liberty on the basis of race, religion or political 
opinion… these three grounds, particularly race and religion, in the context of the attempted 
genocide of the Jews – were those that had been fundamental to the Nazi regime’s horrific 
human rights abuses perpetrated in the concentration camps”. 82 Notwithstanding Walker’s 
apparent confusion along the way regarding the common meaning and usage of the term 
‘Holocaust’( she seems to refer by it not only to the genocide against the Jews but also to other 
persecuted groups under the Nazi regime), she claims that the Holocaust “remains a yardstick 
against which persecution today is often assessed”, and what she seems to alert from is exactly 
what I believe eventually indeed happens – “though it ought not to be seen as exhausting the 
possibilities of persecution”.  
 
The original temporal and geographical limitations imposed on the Convention's scope, as 
they were drafted and adopted in 195183, indicate that the drafters – in accordance with certain 
political interests of those states involved - were only preoccupied with some refugee 
populations situated in Europe at that time, who were displaced as a result of events occurring 
prior to the Convention’s entry into force. Of course, the Holocaust was not the only event 
resulting in flows of refugees and displaced people, occurring prior to January 1st 1951, and 
                                                                 
80 K Walker, ‘Defending the 1951 Convention Definition if Refugee’, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 2003 
p.3-4 
81 The Inter Governmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) was established in 1938 in order to resolve the 
problem of refugees from Germany; its definition of Refugee was later picked up into the Refugee Convention. – 
See: Ibid., p.3-4 
82 I do not dispute this basic assumption about the memory and the influence of the “particular forms of 
persecution” enacted by the Nazi regime on the minds of the drafters who had to determine the outlines of the 
refugee-definition under the Convention; I’m rather not sure whether the drafters have really had in their minds 
only the “attempted genocide of the Jews”, and not, for example, also the attempted genocide of the Gypsies. But 
for this Australian scholar, who writes many years after the drafters’ mission was completed and from within a 
political and intellectual environment that cherish the ‘uniqueness thesis’ regarding the Holocaust, it seems to be 
very compelling to think of the Jews alone as the  one and only genocidal-group victim of the Nazi regime.  
83 The scope of application of the Convention was originally limited to events that occurred prior to January 1, 
1951, in Europe or elsewhere, according to the states’ discretion. However, when the Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees entered into force, on October 4, 1967, this limitations were finally removed – United Nations 
Treaty Series, Vol. 606, p. 267 
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Jews were furthermore not the only refugees within Europe at the time84. But just as much as 
the Holocaust and its Jewish victims and survivors seem to completely occupy the imagination 
of a gentile Australian commentator whom I have cited above, Israeli- judges tend to stage the 
Holocaust and the Jewish refugees problem right at the center of all the various European 
tragedies that occurred prior to that date. 
        
The question whether or not Israel had actually had an historical commitment to the Refugee 
Convention, is irrelevant to the understanding of the strong connotation between the 
Convention and the Holocaust in the thoughts and minds of the Israeli judges. What really 
counts is the common belief regarding such an historical commitment, the particular reasons 
upon which this belief is drawn, and its wide acceptance within Israeli society, and, for our 
subject matter, by the Israeli-judges. 
 
To put under scrutiny this conventional wisdom may be somewhat telling in the context of this 
paper, insofar as it once again reveals the general indifference of Israel to the refugee problem 
at large, and to some extent, even regarding the fate of some Jewish refugees. The first reason 
to doubt its historical commitment to the Convention is that Israel has not transposed the 
Convention’s provisions into its domestic law. One could rightfully argue that an omission to 
do so does not at all express such an historical commitment. 
  
The government's reluctance to ratify the Convention also raises serious questions regarding 
Israel’s commitment to the Convention. Despite the reiterated pleas by different actors about 
Israel being one of the first six states to ratify the convention, it eventually declined to do so. 
Israel’s representative to the ad hoc committee, Dr. Jacob Robinson, seems to have anchored 
his position in favor of such a quick ratification in an obligation stemming directly from 
Jewish morals: “Morality demands that we be among the first six to ratify…”85. According to 
a report by Shabtai Rosenne, the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ legal advisor, Paul Wies, who 
was then the UNHCR Jewish legal advisor, also urged him to have Israel among the first six 
states, and even otherwise “...not to see ourselves exempt from the moral duty of ratifying the 
convention only because it will have entered into force with the sixth ratification”86. 
 
 Moral arguments such as these were responded to by Rosenne in a strict and practical 
manner: “I explained the difficulties and the obstacles obstructing our path and hinted that we 
are not very interested in ratifying this Convention as we have no need for it”87 . The 
                                                                 
84 The concern raised by the Mexican representative to the ad hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related 
Problems, whether the case of Spanish refugees would be also covered under the suggested temporal limitation, 
is only one example for the many different ‘events’ that attracted the attention of the drafters – see: “The Refugee 
Convention, 1951, The Travaux Preparatoires Analysed with a Commentary by Paul Weis” – UNHCR.  
85 Robinson’s letter to the MFA, in R Giladi,“A ‘Historical Commitment’? Identity and Ideology in Israel’s 
Attitude to the Refugee Convention 1951”, The International History Review, 2014, p.8 
86 Ibid., p.9 
87 Ibid., p.9  
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government bureaucrats and Robinson continued to debate the ratification for some time after 
six other states had already done so. It eventually took Israel another three years to ratify the 
Convention, on August 22, 1954. During this time the reasons given by Robinson in favor of 
ratification were shifted from the moral and ethical realm to the political one, but by now his 
political concern differed substantially from the considerations of the Zionist political 
establishment and State. 
  
According to Rotem Giladi, while at least some of Robinson’s considerations regarded also 
the interests of Jewish refugees not wishing to come to Eretz-Israel, his colleagues with their 
narrow perspective could only think about "…Jewish issues as an instrument for promoting 
Israel’s cause”88.  Robinson expressed his concern about Diaspora Jews already upon signing 
the convention: “we will acquire a legal title to help those Jewish refugees in Europe who 
have not yet made their final decision”89 . His colleagues, however, perceived any effort to 
advance Jews' rights in the Diaspora as undermining the Zionist objective of gathering all 
Holocaust survivors in the Jewish state. For the government bureaucrats, so Giladi, the 
Convention was superfluous and suspicious: “superfluous because the Jewish state was, by 
ideological definition, the state of refuge for Jewish refugees; suspicious because it posed an 
ideological challenge to this very raison d’etre. They were uninterested in offering Jewish 
refugees an international legal protection alternative to that offered by the Jewish state”90 . 
 
This kind of instrumentalization of Jewish refugees for Zionist causes was not new to the 
leadership of the newly born Jewish State; already in the days of the post-war Yishuv the 
Zionist leadership has often seemed to consider Holocaust survivors as nothing more than 
means to its end91. Such an instrumental attitude towards Jewish refugees - Holocaust 
survivors, is quite telling; if indeed the Jewish state had the inclination to sacrifice the rights 
of Jewish refugees, about whose entitlement to such rights it had no doubt, we should not be 
                                                                 
88 Ibid., p. 14 
89 Ibid., p.13 note 98 
90 Ibid., p.17 
91 In her seminal book ‘Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood‘, Idith Zertal provides many examples 
for Israel’s instrumentalization of Jewish Holocaust refugees, those who have immigrated to Israel and became 
Israeli citizens and others who remained displaced in Europe. Notable among them is Ben Gurion’s reaction 
when one of his aids reminded him of the Jewish Holocaust survivors refugees who were still on board the ship 
Exodus, already after it was sent back to Germany and while the Zionist movement’s attention was completely 
shifting to the upcoming vote in the UN. Ben Gurion was irritated by a simple remark about the passengers’ 
bravery, and so he snapped: “It’s over, finished. This is the past. Now there is a future”. Another remarkable 
anecdote is related to the reprisal operation of Israeli troops under Ariel Sharon in the village of Qibya in the 
West Bank in October 1953, in which several dozens of Palestinian peasants were murdered. Ben Gurion denied 
Israeli involvement in the attack and attributed the massacre to Holocaust survivors who were allegedly driven by 
avenge. Zertal claims that Ben Gurion exposed the Jewish refugees to a serious and real risk, and that he could 
have done so only due to the fact that Holocaust survivors had had no voice or even real presence within Israeli 
society: “This darkness also symbolize the blindness of this encounter, the absence of a gaze, a Zionist lack of 
recognition and acknowledgment of the Holocaust Survivors as individual human being, which made their 
political use, both then and later, not just possible but also highly effective” – see:  Zertal , p. 48, 177. The State's 
current treatment of the not so many Holocaust survivors who are still alive reveals the same pattern: Although 
Germany has paid heavy reparations to Israel, some fifty thousands of the living Israeli Holocaust survivors live 
in conditions of poverty and their struggle to augment their State pensions keeps making headlines on every 
general election.  See: ‘they have treated Holocaust survivors like they were a bank account’, H’aaretz, 16.4.2015.           
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surprised then by its willingness to violate the rights of present day refugees, whose suffering 
and fears do not convince the State about their entitlement for international protection. Or to 
put it somewhat differently, for the sake of its political interest, Israel is now ready to be a 
priori unconvinced when it is visited by asylum seekers - even regarding the requests for 
asylum of all those who flee some infamously well known producers of refugees such as 
Eritrea.   
                 
At any rate, even if Israel’s attitude to the Convention can be perceived through the wider 
context of the State’s readiness to mobilize even its own people and their suffering for the 
benefit of its political ends, the contradicting belief, namely that for moral and historic reasons 
Israel has a strong commitment to the Convention, remains very much prevalent within 
Israeli-Jewish society. Even Giladi, who concludes that “there had never been a historical 
commitment”92, departs from the opposing presupposition:”...public discourse often turns to 
moral and historical arguments. Central among these is the assertion that Israel owes a special 
duty to asylum seekers – and to the treaty… it is made by civil society bodies and newspaper 
editorials, politicians and activists, academics, attorneys, and judges… none challenges 
Israel’s historical commitment… this conventional wisdom – accepted both by critics and 
government spokespersons – represents a curious area of consensus in the midst of fierce 
political debate about Israel’s treatment of refugees”93 . 
 
This ‘conventional wisdom’ seems to draw on the persecution and suffering experienced by 
the Jewish people during the Holocaust, as well as on the central role that was conferred upon 
Israel in the Convention’s drafting. Those two sources are deeply intertwined: if not for the 
Jewish history of persecution and suffering, it seems rather implausible that Israel would have 
been invited to play such an active role in the Convention’s making. In the same vein, one can 
assume that the High commissioner’s plea for Israel to become one of the first six states to 
ratify the Convention was made only due to the special moral capital that only Israel could 
have conferred upon the newly born refugee regime by doing so. Irrespective of Israel’s actual 
performance throughout the years that came after its signing the Convention, the prevalent 
public opinion, assigning Israel with fundamental involvement in the making the Convention, 
as well as with its acceptance and promotion, is not at all wrong at least regarding the first part. 
  
As a matter of fact, Israel was one among only 13 states elected to be represented in the ad hoc 
Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, which was assigned to draft a Convention 
on this subject94. When the Committee established a working group whose aim was the 
                                                                 
92 Giladi, p.17 
93Ibid., p. 2-3 
94 Alongside Israel, the following countries were represented on the committee: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, 
Denmark, France, Poland, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Venezuela. The Committee was later on called the ad hoc committee on Refugees and Stateless persons – see 
‘The Travaux Preparatoires Analysed with a Commentary by Dr Paul Weis’ – note 20. 
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drafting and polishing of the convention, Israel was once again amongst only very few states, 
six in total, whose representatives were chosen to compose that group.95 
 
 It is also worthwhile to mention, that Apart from the Israeli governmental representation, 
some Jewish NGOs were also represented at that conference by The Israeli representative’s 
brother, Nehemiah Robinson96. The extraordinary participation of these organizations 
exemplifies the symbolic importance that the international community attributed to the Jewish 
people regarding the creation of the refugee protection regime which emerged in the aftermath 
of World War 2. 
 
Regarding the personal contribution of the Israeli representative to the Committee’s work, 
testimonies of other members of the Committee depict Dr. Robinson as a meticulous jurist 
who “expressed his opinion on every single question”97. 
  
Moreover, despite the disinterest in ratification displayed by Israel for several years after it 
signed the Convention, it did, after all, ratify it and was yet only the tenth state to do so.  
 
These facts and their historic context are of course well known to the Israeli judges. They 
habitually refer, in one way or another, to the ‘Jewish context’ of the Convention when dealing 
with its interpretation. Here, for example, Justice Amit: 
 
"The state of Israel and a number of Jewish organizations played an active role in articulating 
the international Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, on the backdrop of the Second 
World War and atrocities of the holocaust, and the state of Israel was one of the first ones to 
sign and ratify the treaty - and not by coincidence. The story of the ship Saint-Louis is still an 
open wound in our memories, a historical lesson and synonym of asylum-seekers who can’t 
find refuge anywhere (the ship Saint-Louis with a thousand Jewish refugees on board, 
departed Germany after the Cristal Night in 1939 and was refused entry to Cuba and the U.S. 
The ship eventually returned to Europe where several countries agreed to grant access to the 
Jews on board, whose majority – except for those who reached England, eventually perished 
during the Second World War).”98  
 
References such as this expose us to the secret path that leads the Israeli judges from the 
starting point of Auschwitz to the final rejection of virtually every asylum application that 
                                                                 
95ibid., p.5 note 24 
96 G Ben Nun, ‘The Israeli Roots of Article 3 and Article 6 of the 1951 Refugee Convention’, Journal of Refugee 
Studies Vol.27, No.1, Oxford University Press, 2013, p.102 
97 Giladi,  p. 6 note 37 
98 HCJ 7146/13  Adam v. the Knesset, (September 2013), p.100; all of the following quotation from verdicts in this 
thesis were translated from Hebrew.  
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draws on any other form of persecution but the one witnessed by the judges' own people in the 
concentration camps. 
 
Because of the ‘Jewish context’ of the Convention, and due to the self centered attitude of 
Jews to the immense culmination of atrocities during the ‘racial century’99, what Israeli judges 
actually see before their eyes when they apply the Refugee Convention is specifically and 
solely the Holocaust and the Jewish refugees who survived it. Consequently, what we might 
call a ‘political reflex’ is then activated in them, as the collective sacred belief regarding the 
Holocaust’s uniqueness, and moreover - its desirable political implication, push them to deny 
the refugee-hood of contemporary asylum seekers. It is as if recognition of that quality of 
present day asylum seekers would inevitably imply a common experience of persecution and 
suffering, shared both by them and the Jews. Recognition of such an intimate acquaintance 
with the sort of suffering experienced by the Jews would undermine the exclusive entitlement 
of the Jewish people to the moral-capital invested in genocide victimhood and at the same time 
empower the newly recognized gentile refugees to evoke valid criticism on the contentious 
Israeli policies. In their reluctance to recognize present day asylum seekers as refugees under 
the Convention, the Israeli judges reinforce the Jewish hegemony in the field of genocidal 
victimhood and exclude from the debate around the morality and legality of some otherwise 
indefensible Israeli conducts any voice emerging from outside of the Jewish world.             
  
  
  
                                                                 
99 Moses, ‘Conceptual blockages and definitional dilemmas in the ‘racial century’: genocides of indigenous 
people and the Holocaust’, p.33 
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5. What Do They Talk About When They Talk About Asylum: Analysis 
of the Figurative Language Used by Israeli Judges 
 
Since 1954, when Israel ratified the Refugee Convention, its judiciary has recognized only two 
individual petitioners as refugees under the convention – by overturning the negative 
administrative decisions on their requests for asylum, and ordering the Government to grant 
them the Refugee status100. Due to the fact that the Israeli court system does not publish 
statistics regarding specific appeals against negative decisions on asylum requests, the total 
number of such legal procedures is unknown. And yet, as seems to be the case in other liberal 
democracies, asylum adjudication in Israel is also characterized by relatively high rate of 
challenge posed by the asylum seekers whose application for asylum has been rejected by the 
administrative authority101. References to the heavy burden posed by the many asylum seekers 
on all relevant state’s organs - amongst them the Courts - can be easily found in one of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions on such an appeal against a negative decision at first instance: "the 
fact that many take advantage of the possibility to appeal for asylum – which indeed amounts 
to a heavy strain for all the relevant authorities dealing with those requests – including the 
courts, cannot inflict on the comprehensiveness and profoundness of the judicial review that 
must be activated in each and every case…"102. 
 
The two court decisions which have recognized asylum seekers as refugees, in comparison 
with even just the number of appeals personally filed by the writer of this text on behalf of 
asylum seekers, requesting the Court to overturn the first instance’s negative decisions and to 
grant them the Refugee status (which were all dismissed) - the two extraordinary approvals of 
refugee status by the Courts do not even amount to 1% of the total. With only two cases in 
which the Court itself recognized a petitioner as refugee, out of the few hundreds or thousands 
of appeals brought before the court, a grim picture is revealed: recognition rate at the Court 
level is even lower than the illusionary one at first instance. 
  
                                                                 
100 See: The District Court of Jerusalem - sitting as a Court for administrative matters, case 729-09-11 Barhana v. 
The Minister of Interior (December 2011) ; The District Court of Lod - sitting as a Court for administrative 
matters, case 3415-05-10 John Faber v. The Ministry of Interior (August 2011). While only the first of these two 
extraordinary decisions became final and indeed resulted in the granting of a Refugee status to the petitioner, the 
latter was subject to appeal brought by the State before the Supreme Court, and was subsequently annulled –SC 
7126/11 The Ministry of Interior v. Faber (June 2012). I will get back to these decisions for deeper discussion.       
101 R Thomas, Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeals, Hart Publishing, 2011, p.12 
102 ISC 0441/13 Chima v. The State of Israel (August 2013). Of course, the essential claim that most if not all of the 
asylum seekers in Israel are merely migrant workers who exploit the Israeli asylum system, is being disputed time 
and again before the Court –“ Who are those "infiltrators"? Why did they come to Israel? In the appeal before us 
the principle dispute between the state and the petitioners is revealed once more – the question regarding the 
infiltrators' identity and their motive to come to Israel, which according to the state is merely finding work and 
improving their standards of living, or rather saving their lives by escaping an immediate threat to their lives and 
health in their countries of origin, as claim the petitioners” – see: HCJ 7385/13 Eytan et al. vs. the Knesset et al 
(September 2014); and although the Court does not determine whether the extremely low recognition rate of 
asylum seekers as refugees is due to the applicants’ profiles as depicted by the state, or to the lack of fairness 
displayed by the MOI, as suggested by petitioners and NGOs, it is sure to still echo the government’s dubious 
claim in different contexts, always in passage.  
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At this point, it is important to tackle two possible preliminary objections to my claim, 
namely:  
 
1. that those two exceptional decisions of the Court do not reveal any special reluctance 
of the judges from recognizing asylum seekers as refugees, since in numerous other 
cases, where the dispute between the asylum seeker and the state is narrowed to the 
issue of the applicability of  the temporary protection regime to the situation of the 
petitioner, the Court shows no hesitation to pro-actively determine that the petitioner is 
in fact a national affiliated to a certain group to which this policy applies. And since for 
a long time - and to a large extent up till today - nationals who constitute the largest 
populations of asylum seekers in Israel were not allowed to go through the RSD 
procedure, overturning such administrative decisions which deprive temporary 
protection from the petitioner, is actually the most pro-active judicial intervention 
possible. 
 
2. that according to a principle of judicial review on administrative decisions, the Court 
should not substitute the administrative authority’s discretion with its own103. If the 
Court does find serious deficiencies in the administrative procedure, only then it may 
cast the case back to the administrative authority for reexamination and consequent 
enactment of a new decision. In accordance with that principle of the Israeli Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence, so goes the claim, the court in fact habitually annuls negative-
decisions on asylum requests which were taken by the MOI, but rather than enacting a 
new decision by themselves, such as affirming the petitioner’s entitlement for the 
Refugee Status, the judges leave that task, as it should be, to the competent 
administrative authority’s discretion.  
I do not wish to challenge the claim that in the narrow context of disputes between an 
individual asylum seeker and the state over the identification of the former as a national of any 
country other than Eritrea or Sudan, the Court is frequently willing to intervene in the 
administrative-decisions. In fact, I know it is so from my professional experience; convincing 
the Court that an administrative decision regarding someone’s nationality is wrong, and 
consequently that a temporary protection policy should apply to that person, is a fairly 
possible task. However, doing the same when what's at stake, instead, is a person’s entitlement 
for the Refugee Status - is practically impossible. Even the most superficial research would 
quickly elicit dozens of court decisions which assertively overturn administrative-decisions 
regarding a person’s identification and the consequent inapplicability of temporary protection 
policy to her situation. What I do like to suggest is, that such a pro-active approach in cases 
regarding the administration of any other right or entitlement to foreign nationals except for 
                                                                 
103 See: AAA 7126/11 The State of Israel vs. kintro Hernandez 
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their possible eligibility for the Refugee Status, is very much in line with my essential claim 
regarding the nature of the relationship between Israeli judges and asylum seekers, namely 
that the Israeli judge stays in line with his reputation as a significantly pro-active ruler – even 
in sensitive matters regarding the handling of asylum seekers, just up to the point of granting a 
refugee status to one of these contemporary asylum seeker.   
 
The alleged apprehension that Israel passes for a decent observer of its commitments under 
international law (without ever recognizing present-day asylum seekers as refugees) allows the 
judges to keep on adhering to their regular- daring jurisprudence in and around this type of 
cases. But the judges’ pro-active approach here only comes to underline the anomaly of their 
tendency for omission when they scrutinize administrative- decisions on the individual’s 
entitlement specifically to the Refugee Status. 
   
 This type of cases shows also that when it comes to temporary protection policy the judges do 
not always restrict themselves to only examining the appropriateness of the administrative 
procedure, but sometimes also enact a new decision under the one they annul. In a majority of 
these cases, when the Court finds that the contested administrative- decision is stemming from 
an inappropriate procedure, instead of returning the case to the competent administrative 
authority, the Court itself fully engages in the process of decision making, i.e. independently 
taking a new decision on the possible applicability of the temporary protection policy to the 
case at hand. 
  
However, when it comes to the ‘hard-core’ asylum cases, meaning those directly dealing with 
a person's entitlement to the Refugee Status, those cases often reveal the Courts’ double 
standard in relation to the abovementioned principle of judicial review on administrative 
matters.  
 
While the Supreme Court’s decision to annul one of the two only decisions ever given by the 
judiciary to recognize a petitioner as refugee, was reasoned by the fact that the lower Court 
wrongly appropriated the administrative authority’s discretion, in other cases, when the Court 
equally finds that some serious fault was made in the administrative procedure from which 
stems a contested administrative-decision, it rather refrains from casting the case back to the 
administrative authority and indeed considers itself rightfully authorized to conduct anew an 
overall examination of the case, which always results in upholding the exact same conclusion 
reached before by the MOI, as if it was essentially right all along - irrespective of the apparent 
deficiencies which brought that decision to be reviewed by the court in the first place 104. 
  
                                                                 
104 Compare: AAA 7126/11 The State of Israel vs. Kitro Hernandez and AAA 7945/12 Igbokwe Francis Chidi vs. 
The State of Israel 
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 It is also important to put the abovementioned principle of judicial review in the right context: 
it refers to situations in which the Court finds that serious faults underpin the administrative 
procedure. Then, the Court is restricted to return the case for reexamination and enactment of a 
new decision by the competent administrative authority. Conversely, when the Court finds that 
the administrative decision itself is extremely unreasonable, then-there are grounds for the 
Court to interfere in the very decision, i.e. to reach a new one to replace the extremely 
unreasonable one. Given the asylum condition in Israel, the question arises: out of the many 
thousands of negative administrative decisions on virtually all asylum applications, logged 
mainly by Eritreans and Sudanese - were there no more than just two extremely unreasonable 
ones? 
 
Boosting the Court’s image as being pro-active also in cases concerning entitlement to the 
Refugee status would be somewhat dubious, even while taking into account its decisions to 
cast cases back to the administrative authority. It is so not only due to the fact that the only 
possible outcome of such reexamination by the MOI is destined to be yet another rejection of 
the asylum request, but mainly because the judges seem to take this path in order to avoid 
taking the otherwise compelling legal decision of recognizing the petitioner before them as a 
refugee. In my view, when the contested negative administrative decision is manifestly 
extremely unreasonable, and is such irrespective of some minor faults that may or may not 
have influenced the administrative procedure, then the judges prefer to simply attribute more 
weight to the deficiencies in the procedure in order to have the hot potato go for yet another 
futile tour at the administrative level, rather than declaring the decision itself extremely 
unreasonable and consequently recognizing the petitioner as refugee all by themselves105. 
 
Now, if the Israeli judiciary has a bias in favor of omission in respect to disputes over the 
individual’s entitlement to the Refugee Status - how can one prove this bias stems from the 
judges commitment to the ‘Holocaust framework”106? If the judges are indeed distracted in 
their work by phantoms of Jewish-refugees, and with all this commotion in their Courtroom 
they somehow mistake the allegedly unique form of persecution witnessed by these phantoms 
for the yard stick with which to measure the actual petitioner’s eligibility for the Refugee 
Status – would they ever mention in their verdicts the surreal appearance before them of those 
misery-stricken visitors? Would they say that through their magnifying glasses what they are 
actually looking for are signs for well founded fear of persecution like the one that was 
witnessed in Auschwitz? 
   
                                                                 
105 Compare: The District Court of Tel-Aviv – sitting as a Court for administrative matters, Case 47226-09-11 
Kamara v. The Minister of Interior (26.12.2012) 
106 N. G. Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry, p. 41. For Finkelstein, “‘the Holocaust’ is an ideological 
representation of the Nazi Holocaust”. Of the two central dogmas underpinning the ‘Holocaust framework’ a-la 
Finkelstein, I’m particularly interested in the first one: “The Holocaust marks a categorically unique historical 
event”.   
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Given that this kind of tendencies are deeply rooted in indoctrination, let alone the 
psychological aspects of such a behavioral phenomenon, and that an accomplished 
indoctrination is never to leave a trace of its occurrence on its subjects, it would be appropriate 
to ask whether the judges are at all aware of the personal and ideological motivations lurking 
behind their rejectionists decisions. If they are aware of that, they must also comprehend the 
tension between their biased professional performance and their expected impartial and highly 
professional one, and thus it shouldn’t come as a surprise if they intentionally blur their 
corruptive personal disposition in order to resolve that possible tension.  
 
What kind of methodology, then, could be deployed in order to prove that when adjudicating 
asylum cases, Israeli judges restrict themselves by the premises and imperatives of the 
‘Holocaust framework’, rather than considering the international refugee law framework as 
their only valid point of reference? 
    
I was advised by some eminent jurists to renounce methodology altogether; Exposing judges’ 
bias, they say, albeit being a hazardous subject for an academic study, may be nevertheless 
possible by employing an empirical method107. Conversely, there is no methodology for 
establishing the motives lying behind the bias of a judge. Judges would simply not tell us 
about that and we cannot just read their minds. Sometimes, a plausible explanation for such a 
phenomenon is simply the best you can offer. If your explanatory framework is compelling 
enough so as to make any alternative explanation grow pale, then it may be valuable enough 
even if not scientifically proven. 
            
As for me, I believe that from everything we have seen so far, from the culmination of 
activities and common political concerns displayed by various Israeli agencies and Jewish 
associations in different fields – history, politics, diplomacy, education and commemoration – 
emerges a pattern that should not be ignored, to say the least, when we investigate the Israeli 
asylum state of affairs, which is best defined as the ‘Denial of (contemporary) refugee-hood’. 
In my view that denial of contemporary refugee-hood is being enacted with as much unlimited 
devotion and passion, both by the Government and the Courts, as is the commemoration of the 
Jewish holocaust and the subsequent promotion of the Uniqueness thesis mentioned earlier in 
this assignment. We may see it in the Israeli historian's refusal to participate in academic 
conferences on genocide which suggest other examples of genocides as legitimate cases in 
point; in the Israeli diplomat's sabotage of efforts made by other genocidal victim-groups to 
gain international recognition also in their personal trauma; the Holocaust museum’s board 
which will assail any initiative to include exhibitions on the genocidal experiences of other 
victim groups. 
                                                                 
107 Compare: HCJ 11163/03 High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel v. the Prime Minister 
(27.2.2006), preamble 18-20 to Chief Justice Barak’s opinion  
 51 
 
  
In that sense we may also mention the Israeli Minister of the Interior, as he is followed by the 
Court. When these two deal with the issue of asylum seekers, deciding on their entitlement to 
the Refugee Status, they are dealing with motifs borrowed directly from the story of their 
lives, with materials that are overwhelmingly famous for their distinct appearance in Jewish 
history. The history of the alleged eternal hatred and persecution of the Jews, with the 
Holocaust at its center, is sacred for them as for the whole of Israeli institutions and society. 
No other possible persecution of other groups and individuals can qualify as sacred, since the 
tools with which the Israeli judges are supposed to assess that suspected persecution's 
magnitude are derived directly from the ‘Holocaust framework’ as they know or promote it. 
Hence those tools and signifiers have a conceived monopoly on sacredness, whatever they are 
juxtaposed against, and hence they apply to the Refugee Convention itself whose reenactment 
need be executed as if in reverence to God itself. [That should be. and from now on they do not 
lose their sacredness wherever they are being placed. The Refugee Convention itself, or more 
accurately, its application in order to recognize refugees, is somewhat sacred and as such it 
should be threatened with god- fearingness. ] 
 
Are Israeli judges acting any differently from the Israeli historian or politician when they deal 
with these sacred elements, deeply rooted in and exclaimed by Jewish mythology? I believe 
they do not. When the Supreme Court was recently asked to order the state to register a ninety 
year old petitioner as a citizen by residence rather than a citizen under The Law of Return, 
justice Rubinstein’s deliberation contained more than just the sheer legalistic argumentation:  
"The Law of Return (…) comes to prevent the second coming of the tragedy of Jewish 
refugees knocking on the gates of one yet another state, and finding them locked for them, 
including the White Book that prevented their entry to our own country, as happened in the 
days before and during the Second World War – the days of the Holocaust. 
The state of Israel as a Jewish Democratic state, is the most precious deposit bestowed on us, it 
is the fulfillment of the Zionist dream, it is the only Jewish state in the world, while it also has 
to try to achieve appropriate equality for minorities; and this court is not a means for eroding 
its essence and nature".108 
 
That comment of Justice Rubinstein came already after the conclusive legal findings of the 
Court, that "we have nothing but the law, and the law is not with him, and that is indeed 
obvious" Ironically, from this superfluous reflection of the Court we reveal that in regard to 
issues intimately associated with the underpinning of Zionist ideology, the Court’s toolkit 
contains more than just the law and its appropriate application; it has also its own pressing 
                                                                 
 
108 HCJ 8140/13 Ornan vs. the State of Israel (December 2013); Professor Ornan claimed that article 4 of The Law 
of Return in conjunction with article 2 of Israeli Nationality Law should have not applied to him since he has not 
registered himself as Jewish in a civil registration conducted decades ago ( Ornan considers himself to be a 
Canaanite).    
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convictions, its ideological stance in favor of the Zionist project, whatever the costs or 
compromises may be.  
 
The Law of Return109, which establishes an exclusive path for naturalization, designated for 
Jews and their spouses, seems to touch upon the Israeli-Jewish public’s collective memory of 
the Holocaust, and as such it provokes the judges to display their ideological commitment to 
the Zionist project rather than to perform a ‘chirurgical’, impartial judicial review. What the 
Court   had implicitly said about The Law of Return in another case, encapsulates its treatment 
as sacred of any legal norm or administrative policy that is said to relay on Holocaust’s 
imperatives -     
  
"…in the Law of Return, which is a symbol of the state being Jewish, I believe there reside 
motifs of sacredness, not in the religious sense but rather in the national and historical sense. 
That is our answer to our persecutors, as well as to the closure of the country's gates for Jews, 
to the White Book, to those indifferent to the suffering who had closed every harbor in the face 
of the Jewish passengers of the MS Saint-Louis in 1939, on the evening of the holocaust; those 
who had sent refugees in the first days of the holocaust to desolate exile in Mauritius in the 
Indian ocean (my mother rest in peace took part in the medical force who had brought them 
here in 1945). That nature of the Law of Return, with its motifs of "national sacredness", 
demands the state and its agents, on the one hand- to open the country's gates to any truly 
eligible person, and on the other hand to stand guard against its violators and those who wish 
for themselves a false right of return." 110 
 
There is much to say about Justice Rubinstein’s stream of consciousness when he reflects 
upon a piece of legislation, which, albeit fundamental for the “Jewish-settlers regime”111, 
simply constitutes yet another element of the state’s nationality law. If considering the 
applicability of that law to the situation of one single petitioner also means paying a 
preliminary visit to the Holocaust’s martyrs, to their perpetrators, to those who silently stood 
by, and - to Justice Rubinstein's late mother and her refugees-protégés, it is not surprising then 
that the possibility of mere immigration fraud transcends the criminal dimension and implies 
the dishonoring of ‘national sacredness’. 
 
I believe that for the Israeli judges, the same psychological burden and ideological imperatives 
are being generated vis-à-vis each and every claim for asylum lodged in Israel. Such extra 
judicial considerations render the possibility of an individual being recognized as refugee even 
though she is not a genuine one, a 'truly outrageous' scheme, to the point of dishonoring the 
                                                                 
109
 The Law of Return, 1950 
110 HCJ 10226/08 Zavidovski v. The Minister of Interior (2.8.2010) 
111 H. Shamir, G. Mundlak, ‘Spheres of Migration: Political, Economic and Universal Imperatives in Israel’s 
Migration Regime’, Middle East Law and Governance 5, 2013, p. 113 
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memory of the Holocaust and its victims. In the same vein, recognizing present day asylum 
seekers as refugees would be tantamount to stealing the ‘moral capital’ belonging to the Jews, 
as well as undermining the presupposition that no one but the Jews – who were the only ones 
to ever witness that certain unique kind of persecution which exclusively produces ‘genuine’ 
refugees - can truly understand Israel, its motives and conducts, and so to also be able to 
criticize it at all.  
 
The virtual 100% rejection rate of asylum appeals at the Court level - just as that same rejection 
rate of the administrative authorities - suits perfectly the pattern that seems to emerge from the 
varied activities of Israeli agencies and Jewish associations in other fields, in relation to issues 
that might somehow affect the perception of the Holocaust as unique, unparalleled and 
incomparable, or undermine the current distribution of moral capital and immunity from 
critique that stems out of that perception.  
 
Considering the abovementioned reservations regarding the very possibility to prove what is 
in the judges’ heart, the question may well be whether the identification of such a pattern is 
sufficient to support the hypothesis that the judges’ jurisprudence regarding asylum cases is 
also shaped, just as much as the work of the committed historian or diplomat, by the 
underpinnings of the ‘Holocaust framework’. 
  
In my opinion, the behavioral pattern that emerges from the corpus of activities of different 
Israeli and Jewish actors, and its suitableness also to the issue of the judges’ rejectionist 
approach toward asylum seekers, do attribute great plausibility to my hypothesis about the 
judges’ motives. And yet, as we could clearly see from the abovementioned examples of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions, albeit on cases related to The Law of Return and not directly 
concerning asylum claims, an analysis of the figurative language of the judges may furnish a 
further valuable support to my claims (moreover since those two legislative guidelines – the 
Law of Return and the Refugee Convention - can be seen as a 'mirror image' of one another, 
both revolving around the issue of granting access and rights to a foreign national, while the 
legal subjects in each of those pieces of legislation are found on two opposing poles of 
favorability, as far as it is demonstrated by the Israeli establishment and court). 
  
Not all of the most relevant and telling references of the Courts to the Holocaust are to be 
found in its decisions on asylum issues; of the ones that do, some seem to be given in support 
to the state’s rejectionist policies and individual decisions, while others do quite the contrary. 
All in all, I am not sure whether the limited - number of cases which permit such an analysis 
constitute a sufficient empirical basis to prove my claims. If taken alone, they may not even 
have a sufficient suggestive strength to fully convince the reader about the complex 
explanation I wish to offer for the ‘denial of refugees-hood’ by the Court. Alongside the 
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theoretical explanatory framework and the pattern that emerges from the activities of 
analogous Israeli and Jewish actors, I hope that the following illustrative analysis of the actual 
language used in some relevant cases will provide the reader with supplemental, though 
decisive, support to my essential claims. 
 
The ruling of the Court in Balca112 provides us with an outstanding illustration of the judge’s 
flow of Holocaust-related associations when he examines, inter alia, whether the 72 
petitioners, Ethiopian nationals, are likely to face threats to life or freedom if expelled to 
Ethiopia. In this case the Court also reveals its interest in protecting the states’ public image in 
relation to its treatment of asylum seekers and refugees.  Although the Court generally agrees 
with the state's reservations regarding the inadmissibility of the petition, it nonetheless decides 
to hear the case for …"focusing the public attention on that discussion actually enhances the 
criticism towards the respondent (the state of Israel in this case) generated on the background if 
its handling of refugee issues in general and Ethiopian citizens found in Israel in particular. 
That is also why I believe that the appeal should exceed the judicial debate in order for it to be 
resolved and for the resolution to be visible for the public eye". 
  
That been said by the judge, the Court’s examination of the merits, and its final conclusion that 
the principle of non-refoulement does not apply to the situation of the petitioners, could be 
seen now as transcending the scope of the case at hand and aiming at absolving the state 
altogether for its alleged maltreatment of refugees.  
 
But more revealing than the Court’s preoccupation with the state’s good reputation is the 
connotation made by the judge between the issue at stake and the history of the eternal hatred 
and persecution of Jews. Already when setting forth the relevant legal framework to the case, 
justice Mudrick, who is also the former Chief Military Advocate General, states that Israel’s 
obligation to protect foreign nationals from persecution stems not only from its legal 
commitment under international law but also from moral considerations: "That commitment is 
also morally grounded, in a state on whose tradition's flag engraved for eternity is the sentence 
"for you lived as an alien in the land of Egypt", and whose being's essence has been 
crystalized by the atrocities of Jew's persecution throughout all generations".  
 
If the history of Jews hatred serves here as the source for Israel’s moral obligations towards 
people in need of international protection, immediately afterwards, in a footnote, it is being 
utilized to somewhat negate the petitioners’ complaints about their maltreatment by the Israeli 
authorities: 
 
                                                                 
112 The District Court of Tel-Aviv – sitting as a Court for administrative matters,  case 2028/05 Zanbek Balca et al. 
vs. the Minister of Interior (February 2006) 
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"Each of the appeals opens with Alterman's "The Swedish Tongue" venerating Sweden, 
which unlike other nations, had opened its gates for Danish Jews escaping the Nazi horrors. 
That intro is an agitation, as if preaching to the state of Israel. I shall not polemicize with these 
things, and shall limit myself to examining the legal rights of the appellants. Nevertheless I 
shall note that the Jewish holocaust refugees were refugees of a genocide according to every 
human scale, and their fate – as well as the fate of millions of other displaced people in that 
war – were the basis for the articulation of the UN's Refugee Treaty. I am not the one to review 
Israel's history regarding refugee's status since 1951 (there were some who heavily criticized 
that history but still took acknowledged the impressive list of humanitarian gestures towards 
different refugee groups) (…) at least since 2002 the state bases its decisions regarding refugee 
protection on the recommendations of the UN commissionership. I believe that this fact 
projects heavily on any possible justification for "waving" Alterman's rhymes, as beautiful 
and firm as they may be." 
 
Since Jewish-refugees, or the Holocaust altogether, have absolutely nothing to do with the 
questions before the Court – what is the law? What is the law’s appropriate interpretation and 
how to apply it to the case at hand? – Any reference to the Holocaust, irrespective of its actual 
content, is superfluous; I would not expect the judges to mention any of that when they uphold 
a decision to revoke someone’s asylum request, and indeed they mostly do not. It might have 
been appropriate to mention the persecution and suffering in the Jewish context when they 
recognize someone as refugee and offer her an international protection, so as to say "we've 
learned history's lesson". But then again, they hardly-ever recognize anyone as refugee. 
 
What we have here instead is truly remarkable: not only that Justice Mudrick resorts to the 
Holocaust within the framework of a rejectionist decision, but also the content of his 
comments is highly contentious; it implies a sort of competition between Jewish refugees and 
present day asylum seekers, a hierarchy of suffering and vulnerability. If it is said that Jewish 
refugees were genuine ones under some human standard, then, who is not? And why does it 
seem that to launch an ethical critique against Israel is per-se inappropriate? Do these two 
notions somehow relate to each other? 
 
The judgment of the Supreme Court in Chima113 illustrates well the discrepancy between the 
situations in which the judges adhere to the principle of not substituting the administrative 
authority's discretion on the one hand, and the situations implying a de facto new decision 
enacted by Court itself on the other. In my view, when the administrative procedure is deemed 
defective, the decision whether to cast the case back for reexamination to the administrative 
authorities, or rather to independently enact a new decision under it – depends to a large extent 
on the judges' impression of the petitioner’s entitlement to the Refugee Status; if they believe 
                                                                 
113 ISC 14430/13 Chima v. The State of Israel (August 2013)  
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the petitioner does meet the Convention’s requirement, they would most likely cast the case 
right back to the MOI. If they are convinced of the opposite, it is more likely they will validate 
the same conclusion of the MOI (that was derived from the defective administrative procedure) 
and decide to spare another round of examination at the administrative level.  
 
In this case, both justice Meltzer, who wrote the majority opinion, and the dissenting judge, 
Amit, engage in full examination of the merits. From justice Meltzer’s deliberation it seems 
like he believes the petitioner has in fact proved to be having a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted, on one of the grounds stipulated in the Convention. But the MOI rejected the 
petitioner’s request for asylum already at a preliminary stage of its examination, a fact that 
depicts the administrative procedure altogether substantially defected. Given that, and 
according to the principle of judicial review on administrative matters, Justice Meltzer 
restricts himself to ordering the state to examine the petitioner’s application anew. 
  
Conversely, justice Amit does not seem to share the view that the Minister of Interior has done 
wrong by dismissing the application at such a preliminary stage. And he tries to prove this (in 
essence - that the petitioner is not a refugee, and so the hasty administrative rejection of his 
request for asylum could not have been so wrong after all) by referring to facts and reasons that 
were never before taken in account by the MOI. He might have been aware of this 
anachronism and so from his dissenting opinion it remains somehow unclear whether the MOI 
should have after all rejected the petitioner’s request for asylum already at that preliminary 
stage. But knowing what he seems to know by now about the petitioner, he states – "…at any 
rate, I see no reason to cast the petitioner's case back to the asylum seekers' unit… 
 
For justice Amit, casting the case back for reexamination by the MOI is futile because he has 
already personally reached a negative decision on the petitioner's request for asylum, and there 
is zero probability the MOI will reach a different one if obliged to reexamine the case for the 
second time. What justice Amit had actually done is to reach a de facto new decision under the 
one, identical in substance, which was previously taken by the MOI, but could not stand due to 
the serious deficiencies in the administrative procedure from which it has resulted. Justice 
Meltzer is aware of justice Amit’s infringement of the Court’s jurisprudence: "If it was found 
that there was no reason to begin with, for inexorably renouncing an asylum request – it would 
be inappropriate in my opinion for a reviewing court to step into the shoes of the 
administrative authority and take it upon itself to examine the case as a whole, as suggested in 
paragraph 5 dissenting on my colleague's opinion, judge Amit. The proper solution, in my 
opinion, for this kind of cases: casting the case back to be re-examined by the administrative 
authority."  
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But despite judge Meltzer's firm stance, we may very well ask why is it that for him recasting 
the case back to the MOI would ever be considered as having any remedial effect altogether? 
Seemingly never be judged as ineffectual by justice Meltzer? After all, throughout his 
examination of the merits, the impression one gets is that he takes the opposite view of justice 
Amit, that is, that the petitioner is a refugee. And considering the virtually inexistent 
recognition rate at first instance, it is rather obvious that the MOI would never reach, even if 
obliged to conduct a new examination, a different decision other than its original, negative, 
one.  
 
We may conclude then, that in cases like these it is the judge’s view of the petitioner's 
entitlement for the Refugee Status which determines also whether one of two possible courses 
of action, in case the administrative procedure is deemed to have been seriously defected, 
either that the Court would recast the case back to the MOI, or rather ignores its own 
jurisprudence by reaching a de facto new decision, corresponding to the one previously taken 
by the MOI but resulted from a manifestly- defected administrative procedure. If the judge 
believes the petitioner is not a refugee, then irrespective of the Court’s declared jurisprudence 
he is likely to spare such a new examination at the administrative level by independently 
reaching the exact same decision as the contested one. And if, conversely, the judge seems to 
believe the petitioner is a refugee, then he would probably never be led by the assumption that 
new examination by the MOI is futile. Otherwise, he would have to recognize the petitioner as 
a refugee all by himself, which is ideologically undesirable. Needless to say that for the 
petitioner, both of these outcomes equally implies the rejection of his asylum request – already 
at the appeal level or yet again, a bit farther down the road, again by the administrative 
authorities.  
 
Interestingly enough, within the framework of Justice Meltzer’s majority opinion - which in 
his eyes must have been seen as providing the greatest possible relief for the petitioner – also 
the following argument is included: 
 
"In conclusion, we – who belong to a people who knew exile, and whose ancestors needed 
refuge time and again – are obliged to profoundly inspect any request for political asylum." 
 
Not surprisingly, you will not find allusions of that kind in Justice Amit’s rejectionist opinion. 
These remarks are reserved solely to situations in which the judge orders the government to 
reexamine a case anew or when it provides asylum seekers with protection of their peripheral-
rights. Notwithstanding that the relief offered to the petitioners in this type of decisions falls 
short of their hope to be recognized as refugees, their relatively favorable treatment by the 
judge permits then its attribution to an alleged Jewish historical commitment towards asylum 
seekers and refugees. Conversely, it is rather obvious why the judges would almost never set 
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forth any references to the Holocaust while upholding an administrative decision to revoke 
someone’s request for asylum.  
 
Another example for the principles and function of this economy of holocaust allusions can be 
found in Martinez114. In this case, the Court finds that the basic assumption of the MOI 
regarding the petitioner’s unreliability is extremely unreasonable. The fact that the petitioner’s 
version is allegedly unreliable has underpinned both the MOI’s first negative decision and 
then the second one, which was taken in the framework of the petitioner’s consequent 
application for reconsideration of his case.  On the face of it, it seems like the reasonableness 
of the very administrative decision is what's being refuted by the Court. If this is the case, then 
why does the Court fail to interfere in the decision, dictating on its turn a new, proper one? In 
principle, the idea is that administrative matters such as these should be left to the discretion of 
the competent administrative authority. Here, the administrative authority has already 
established that the petitioner’s version is unreliable and thus rejected his request for asylum. 
It used its discretionary power – twice already – and what it produced is the contested decision 
at hand, a decision most accurately reflecting the MOI’s autonomous-discretion. But the judge 
here refrained from annulling the administrative decision for it is substantially unreasonable 
;under such circumstances, an annulment would serve de facto as declaring the petitioner is a 
refugee – a turn she preferred to avoid. What the judge did instead - a juridical maneuver more 
suitable to the field of political strategy perhaps - is annulling the decision on the ground that 
the administrative procedure from which it resulted was somehow defected. According to the 
Court, it is so because the MOI had based its final decision on an unreasonable assumption 
about the petitioner’s unreliability, and from there on the rest of the examination procedure 
was supposedly defected. Determining the annulment of the administrative decision through 
the prism of the administrative procedure’s properness is how the judge restricted herself with 
the principle of judicial review on administrative matters that was lengthily discussed before. 
She ordered the MOI to reexamine anew the petitioner’s request for asylum, under the 
assumption that his version is reliable. For the petitioner it meant nothing but another waiting 
period before the MOI will reach, not surprisingly, another negative decision on his 
application. 
  
Here, again, justice Agmon–Gonnen probably frames her decision as most favorable for the 
petitioner, and thus she found it fit to make allusions to the Holocaust – 
 
"The treaty, anchoring refugee rights, was created as a remedy for millions of people turning 
refugees as a result of the atrocities of the holocaust and the Second World War. The state of 
Israel was fifth in order of signing the convention, and immediately upon its establishment it 
                                                                 
114 The District Court of Tel-Aviv – sitting as a Court of administrative matters, case 46427-07/11 Sanday 
Martinez vs. the State of Israel 
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strove, alongside Jewish organizations, to articulate the treaty and achieve broad rights for 
refugees and asylum seekers. In the treaty's accompanying statements it was noted that its aim 
is to prevent the reoccurrence of a situation in which refugees who were persecuted and 
managed to reach another state, will be deported back to the country from whence they came." 
 
Another telling reference to the Jewish context of the Convention comes on the backdrop of 
the judges’ peculiar comment about the actual difficulties which Israel is now facing as a 
result of the massive influx of migrants into its territory:  
 
"as a side note to my decision I would like to add that one cannot ignore the real difficulty 
facing the country in the shape of the waves of immigration flowing into it, bringing about 
many difficult problems…but at the same time one shall not ignore the stipulations of the 
Refugee Treaty which the state of Israel strove to create and took upon itself, with all due 
consequences, including the juridical review of those stipulations". 
   
If Israel is legally bound by the Convention – what difference does it make that it had also 
promoted its enactment and acceptance? Why mentioning it at - all, and already for the second 
time in a rather short - two and half pages verdict? The fact that Israel - irrespective of the 
invitation it had surely and not-coincidently received, and the active role it eventually played 
in the drafting of the convention – has actually shown no interest at all in promoting the 
convention's acceptance, does not change the meaning behind the judges’ urge to mention this 
conventional wisdom about the alleged historical commitment of Israel to the Convention.  
 
Moreover, the tension between the actual historical record and the fallacy of that conventional 
wisdom highlights the fact that these half-truths, not to say inventions, must have then some 
political function. This conventional wisdom suits perfectly to the notion that Jewish 
suffering, for its unique magnitude, stands alone at the center of the entire history of world’s 
cruelty and pain. Every instrument - legal, political or educational - with which the 
international community deals now with the destruction of human values and its affect on 
human beings - be it refugees or victims of genocide- is being measured first, in our minds, by 
the scale of the long gone Jewish Holocaust victims. And so is the Refugee Convention 
perceived, as essentially rooted exclusively in the specific history of Jewish persecution. 
  
Making recourse to this conventional wisdom within decisions that are "relatively favorable" 
for asylum seekers (favorable, yet without challenging the central paradigm of the ‘Holocaust 
framework’ – by actually recognizing any one as refugee) seems to be the most advantageous 
one in filling at least something in the lacking compliance of Israel with the natural 
expectation from it to treat asylum seekers in a fair and decent manner. Mentioning it in such 
cases and hindering from doing so where the Court upholds negative administrative decisions 
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on asylum requests, do not mean the Judge is not just as preoccupied with Holocaust’s 
memories and their vivid images also when she dismisses an asylum-seeker’s appeal. There is 
no possible reason for the judge to think about the Holocaust while protecting some rights of 
the asylum seeker and not thinking about it when depriving the asylum seeker from Refugee 
Status. 
                            
In my view, the judges are always far more keen to comply with the paradigms of the 
‘Holocaust framework’ than to reinforce the state’s compliance with international law, and 
indeed they virtually never display the opposite disposition in the form of recognizing 
someone as refugee. In order to stay in line with the ‘Holocaust framework’, they must first 
observe its fundamental underpinnings, keep them in mind of ; however, I would not expect 
them to mention any of that when they uphold the rejection of someone’s asylum request, and 
indeed they hardly ever do. Their mentioning of it in the context of relatively favorable 
decisions to the asylum seekers suffices for us to assume they are possessed by the exact same 
reflections when dealing with all asylum cases at large. 
  
Justice Agmon-Gonen’s latter remark about the high number of asylum seekers staying in 
Israel and the many difficulties resulting from their presence, exemplifies an ever growing 
shift from the universal humanitarian imperative - upon which the admittance of asylum 
seekers and the consideration of their requests for asylum are typically based - to the political 
and the economic imperatives which are usually attached to different spheres of migration115 .  
If there is any place at all for this kind of utilitarian consideration in relation to asylum issues, 
it should be only in the framework of constitutional petitions on these matters, where they may 
be relevant for the purpose of proportionality test116. Taking in account such considerations, so 
foreign to the question of the individual asylum seeker’s need and right for international 
protection, is not only legally wrong, but is also quite ironical, given that no such or other 
considerations would ever be accepted as justification for the denial of Jewish refugees by the 
world’s nations during WW2.  
 
From the inflammatory words of Justice Rubinstein in Ornan comes out the resentment and 
the un-forgiveness towards the nations which were indifferent enough to close their gates for 
Jewish refugees fleeing the Nazi perpetrators. Notwithstanding forgiveness, and also the 
faculty to forget, have an indispensable role in the restoration of any relationship, whether 
between individuals or nations117, the yet resisting hard- feelings in this case are not too 
                                                                 
115 See: H Shamir & G Mundlak, p. 116 
116 According to Article 9 to the Convention, exceptional circumstances may entail a Contracting State to take 
provisionary measures which it considers to be essential to national security. In light of that provision, 
circumstances regarding the number of asylum seekers or the reception capacity of the hosting state may be 
relevant. But when it comes to the asylum-situation in Israel, nothing amounts to such “grave and exceptional 
circumstances”: “…the burden on the State of Israel in handling asylum seekers is not higher than the one 
experienced by other western countries…” – see: Eitan, preamble 3 to justice Arbel’s opinion. 
117 A Ophir, ‘Between Eichmann and Kant: Thinking on Evil after Arendt’, Indiana University Press, 2011, p. 95 
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surprising given the terrible fate of all those Jewish refugees who were refuted on the 
boarders. It seems to be exactly that which still fuels the rancor   – the extreme magnitude of 
suffering should have not permitted the bystander to prevent protection from the ones in need. 
When matters of life and death, or threat to fundamental human liberties are at stake, then 
economical consideration cannot stand as a legitimate reason for not offering shelter to those 
at risk.  
 
After all, the denial of entry from Jewish refugees fleeing Nazism, which was common among 
almost all nations of the world - from the United States to Switzerland - stemmed not only 
from anti-Semitism or sheer xenophobia, but also, and most importantly, from economic 
considerations118.  And yet, it is not being perceived as a legitimate reason for the much 
deplored decision not to offer asylum to those vulnerable Jewish refugees. As Finkelstein puts 
it, “...'The world’s silence', 'the world’s indifference', 'the abandonment of the Jews': these 
themes became a staple of 'Holocaust discourse'”119. Justice Amit’s remark about the denial of 
the Jewish-refugees aboard the MS St. Louis, resonates these themes, and so do various 
statements of Elie Wiesel, maybe the most prominent representative of the ‘Holocaust 
framework’ (“there were the killers – the murderers – and there were those who remained 
silent”120); As always, detecting the different sources proliferating these identical ideas in 
different fields, appears to be very helpful in connecting the players and establishing their 
common political interest. And so the Minister of Interior and the judge, who express and fuel 
the long lasting rancor towards those indifferent nations who stood by in silence, leverage 
their resentment and indisputable monopoly over victimhood in order to block and castrate 
any possible criticism which is trying to point out that what they are doing, the decisions they 
are taking in regards to present day asylum seekers, are a complete replica of the actions they 
resent and reproach so deeply.  
 
But the Minister of Interior and the judge simply do not believe them to be refugees; 
otherwise, they would not deny entry from a group of Eritreans, pending on the Sinai desert 
boarder fence for over a week121 nor would they revoke virtually all asylum requests lodged in 
Israel, not because of the sheer economic burden caused by their admittance. In this state of 
‘denial of refugee-hood’, which in my view stems from the ‘Holocaust framework’, even 
nationals of states which are officially acknowledged by the UN as major producers of 
                                                                 
118 Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry, p. 103-104 
119 Ibid., p.49 
120 E Wiesel, And the Sea Is Never Full: Memoirs, Shocken, 2000, p.68. 
121 In 2012, a group of 21 Eritrean asylum seekers stumbled upon the fence along the Israeli-Egyptian border and 
were denied entry. They were sitting in the desert for more than a week pressed against the fence when a petition 
was submitted to the Supreme Court; the Court, for its part, was not in a rush to reach a decision. A few hours 
after the Court hearing, while the case was still pending, Israeli soldiers violently expelled 18 men and admitted 
two women and a child into the country for “exceptional humanitarian considerations” – see: HCJ 6582/12 Anu 
Plitim v. Ehud Barak – Minister of Defense et al. (2012); Isabel Kershner, ‘Israel to Admit 3 of 21 African Waiting 
in Desert’, New York Times (sep. 6, 2012) – http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/world/middleeast/israel-to-
admit-3-of-21-african-waiting-in-desert.html?r=0   
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refugees are, a-priori and regardless of any serious examination, mere infiltrators who only 
seek to improve their economic situation. 
  
The three separate decisions of the High Court of Justice regarding the constitutionality of the 
three reincarnations of the Amendments to the Prevention of Infiltration Law are central to this 
part of my analysis. They are so telling not only due to the many allusions to the Holocaust 
that can be found there, especially in the majority judges’ opinions; it is that these decisions 
encapsulate the disparity between the Court’s regular pro-active approach (displayed also here 
in relation to the infringement of asylum seekers’ constitutional right to liberty and dignity 
while they stay in Israel), and its governmental-minded approach when it comes to the 
protection of the same rights, and above all the asylum seekers’ right to life, if returned to their 
countries of origin contrary to the fundamental principle of non-refoulement.  
  
Amendment no. 3 of the Prevention of Infiltration Law allowed holding asylum seekers in 
administrative detention for three years and was challenged in Adam122. Shortly after the Court 
had struck down the arrangement for being unconstitutional, Amendment no.4 to the law was 
enacted, allowing now to hold asylum seekers in administrative detention for a year, which 
will be followed by indefinite detention at the Holot ‘open’ detention facility. This 
arrangement was challenged in Eitan 123 and was also set aside by the Court due to the un-
proportionate limitations on the "infiltrators'" constitutional rights. Following this second 
ruling of the Court, the Knesset was once again prompt in passing Amendment no.5 to the law, 
according to which only migrants who enter Israel after the entry to force of the amendment 
may be detained for a period of 3 months; preamble D of the amendment regards a potential 
‘infiltrator’ whose expulsion back to his country of origin results in difficulty “of any kind”. In 
this case, the ‘infiltrator’ may be held in an ‘open’ detention facility for 20 months. Both parts 
of this arrangement were challenged in Desta124, and while this time the shorter duration and 
the allegedly legitimate purpose of the detention rendered it constitutional and it was upheld 
unanimously, chapter D of the law was struck down for the un-proportionate restrictions it 
puts on the ‘infiltrator’s’ constitutional right to liberty and human dignity. 
   
All three judgments were opened with a sort of introductory statements regarding the 
challenges and difficulties with which Israel has to confront due to the influx of ‘infiltrators’ 
crossing into its territory: 
 
                                                                 
122 HCJ 7146/12 Adam V. the Knesset (September 2013) 
123 HCJ 7385/13 Eitan – Israeli Immigration Policy Center, et al. V. the Israeli Government (September 2014) 
124 HCJ 8665/14 Desta et al. V. the Minister of Interior (August 2015) 
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"The infiltrators phenomenon, which has been expanding in Israel, influences different sectors 
of the state. It also has significant influence on the interior and public security. A profound 
change has occurred in the life fabric of urban areas, as well as in the economy and market”.125 
 
“Tens of thousands of infiltrators from Eritrea and Sudan have entered the state of Israel in 
recent years. The executive and legislative authorities have tried to handle the ramifications of 
this phenomenon in several ways…"126 
 
"In recent years tens of thousands of people have entered Israel not through border check-
points... in the face of the infiltration phenomenon Israel is facing complex challenges" 127. 
 
Notwithstanding the potential relevance of factors such as these to the proportionality tests 
conducted in the framework of constitutional judicial review, open statements have a special 
rhetoric power and the decision to dedicate them to this aspect of the issue frames the 
economic and political imperatives as most central also to the reviewed spheres of migration 
in this cases. This starting point fits the state’s presupposition, according to which "the 
majority of the infiltrators population – coming from North Sudan and Eritrea – are 
immigrants coming to Israel due to economical motives, in order to work and earn money to 
improve their standard of living and support their relatives left behind in their countries of 
origin"128.  
  
Although the Court considered also the petitioner’s counterargument, namely that the vast 
majority of this population is composed in fact of asylum seekers and refugees, and 
acknowledges that at least in relation to some of them – "one cannot easily renounce the 
claims about the dangers they experience in their country of origin", it adheres to the 
terminology configured by the legislator – which does not distinguish between asylum-seekers 
and other irregular migrants – and refers to all the affected subjects of the law with the 
degrading term ‘infiltrators’129 
 
Yet, these terminological and contextual biases did not prevent the Court from displaying its 
most pro-active performance when it struck down, totally or partly, three different 
reincarnations of the same legislative piece, due to their un-proportional infringement of the 
so-called infiltrators’ constitutional rights. The first ruling of the Court in Adam was already 
                                                                 
125 See: Adam, p.4 
126 See: Eitan, preface to the Central opinion  
127 See: Desta, preamble 1-2 to Chief Justice Naor’s central opinion 
128 Eitan, preamble 6 to justice Vogelman’s central opinion 
129 The Court is using this term notwithstanding justice Fogelman’s preliminary remark in Eitan: "The Term 
'Infiltrator' is originally used to describe those who enter Israel in order to perform crimes and acts of terror…the 
legislator's rhetoric choices are not at our judgment, but we must not let them dim the essence. We must 
remember that those new 'infiltrators' did not come to our borders in order to perform hostile actions, and that 
many of them see themselves as asylum seekers. However despite this remark, I shall use in my opinion the term 
as it is legally articulated" – see: Eitan, preamble 5 to Justice V’s opinion  
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highly unpopular, and the Court’s following judgments have only further augmented the 
general public’s disapproval. Justice Arbel, who wrote the central opinion in Adam, was fully 
aware of that:"In conclusion, I must assume that this ruling will not be easy for the Israeli 
public, and especially to the residents of South Tel Aviv, whose distress reflected in their 
outcry seems to be coming from the heart and evokes empathy and understanding as for the 
need to help them in their situation."130   
 
The Court’s impressive persistence in protecting the asylum-seekers’ right to liberty and 
human dignity while in Israel highlights even more its deplored overlooking of their 
deprivation from effective international protection, and I will soon further elaborate on this 
point. For now, I would like to frame those decisions as relatively favorable for asylum 
seekers, and compile together some of the Holocaust’s allusions made by the judges in support 
of their ruling, mostly in the concluding parts of their opinions – 
 
In Adam: 
 
"The state of Israel along with Jewish organizations have taken an active part in the drafting of 
the international treaty concerning the status of refugees, on the backdrop of the Second World 
War and the atrocities of the holocaust, and the state of Israel was furthermore one of the first 
states to sign and ratify that treaty. And not in vain. The story of the MS Saint Louis is still 
engraved in our consciousness as an open wound, as an historical lesson and a synonym for 
asylum seeking refugees who are not welcome anywhere... the Saint Louis eventually returned 
to Europe where a few countries agreed to let its passengers in, many of whom – except for 
those who entered Britain – were killed during the War"131. 
 
"The state of Israel is signed on the international treaty of refugee rights since 1951. The year 
the treaty was signed, as well as its title, tells something about the special sensitivity of the 
state of Israel regarding that issue, also on the backdrop of the special history – the far and the 
near ones – of our people and country"132. 
  
In Eitan: 
 
"The state of Israel, which was one of the 26 states whose delegates took part in drafting the 
refugee convention, has signed it in 1951 and was one of the first states to ratify it in 1954 (also 
since the population the treaty was dealing with was that of the Second World War's refugees, 
including the Jewish ones)"133. 
                                                                 
130 Adam, preamble 120 to justice Arbel's central opinion 
131 Adam, preamble 3 to justice Amit’s opinion 
132 Adam, preamble 2 to justice Hendel’s opinion 
133 Eitan, preamble 33 to justice Vogelman’s central opinion 
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"Even though in the media depicts it differently, up to date data tells us that the burden on the 
state of Israel in handling asylum seekers is not higher than the one experienced by other 
western countries… this burden should be taken with understanding, especially on the 
backdrop of Jewish history…"134. 
 
"As the Supreme Court of the state of Israel comes to deliberate the infiltrators issue, it cannot 
ignore that Israel is a Jewish and democratic state according as defined by its basic  law. The 
state's Jewishness is not expressed only in the principles of the Hebrew Law, in my opinion, 
but also in its people's history. With this perspective, and on the backdrop of the deportations 
we've experienced in different eras, one has to be sensitive to the other who is looking for a 
new home, even temporarily. That obligation is part of the whole picture. We must aid as 
much as possible, and acknowledge that that is a hard situation. Life is unbearable in Sudan 
and Eritrea, where most of the infiltrators come from. That given situation only enhances the 
recognition of our well-being, of enjoying the fruits of democracy and prosperity. It is not a 
mere practical consideration, but in my view it is also a part of the people's definition" 135. 
 
And in Desta: 
  
"…Hebrew Law and Jewish history – are highly sensitive to the two polarities and to the 
tension between them: on the one hand – the commandment to love the foreigner, the care for 
her and to be sensitive to the refugee, on the backdrop of our people's upheavals throughout 
history, and on the other hand- the rule saying "the poor in your own land are first"136. 
 
"…as someone whose ancestors used to be, in the far past, foreign labourers in another land, 
and in the nearer future have knocked in vain on the gates of different countries while fleeing 
from the Nazi regime, and were renounced – we are demanded to utilize the relevant juristic 
tools with compassion and sensitivity towards all involved. That is necessary because we are a 
Jewish democratic state."137. 
 
As we have seen before, also in these rulings the judges habitually make recourse to the 
Holocaust as if to find further support, from outside the legal dimension, to their relatively 
favorable decisions regarding asylum seekers. If they do not make allusions to the Holocaust 
when upholding the first instance’s negative decisions on asylum claims – it does not mean 
they do not visit these foreign realms also then. If the consideration of asylum seekers’ right to 
liberty provokes in the judges connotations to the Holocaust, then, the same must be 
                                                                 
134 Eitan, preamble 3 to justice Arbel’s opinion 
135 Eitan, preamble 14 to justice Hendel’s opinion 
136 Desta, preamble 9 to justice Hendel’s opinion 
137 Desta, Preamble 17 to justice Meltzer’s opinion 
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happening also when they deal with the core of all asylum issues – entitlement to the Refugee 
Stats and to international protection.  
 
The three verdicts regarding the Amendments to the Prevention of Infiltration Law exemplify 
also the discrepancy between the Court’s regular highly-daring jurisprudence – displayed also 
in cases relating to asylum seekers’ ‘peripheral’ rights, and their governmental- minded 
approach when at stake is the asylum seeker’s entitlement for the refugee status and to 
international protection. A display of the second, anomalous approach, can be found in the 
Court’s way of dealing with one of the petitioners’ central claims, the one regarding the 
hidden - actual purpose behind the legal authorization to hold ‘infiltrators’ in the ‘Holot’ 
“open” detention center. 
  
The claim is, that in contrast to the proclaimed purposes of chapter D of the law, the actual, 
hidden, purpose is to break the detainees' spirit in order to promote their ‘voluntary return’ to 
their countries of origin or to some third country. Chapter D of the law was added to it after the 
Court’s first ruling in Adam, and was contested both in Eitan and Desta. In the framework of 
the constitutional examination of the amendment, the question regarding the purpose is a 
central pillar. If the law limits rights enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 
- as it was established in the case at hand - it would deem to be constitutional only if 
withstanding the conditions of the limitation clause in the basic law. The limitation clause 
conditions that the limitation of the protected rights is made by a statute and befits the values 
of the state of Israel. The more complex condition regards the proper-purpose of the law. 
  
In both the second and the third cases, the state proclaimed that the amendment has some few 
legitimate purposes, among them also to deter ‘infiltrators’ from reaching Israel. The Court 
has found that purpose, if stands on its own, to be improper, but since it was only secondary 
and incidental to the main purpose of the law – to prevent the settling down of ‘infiltrators’ in 
the centers of the cities – the Court had examined mainly the properness of that proclaimed 
central purpose of the statute. 
  
That the suggested alternative purpose of the amendment – breaking the spirits of the 
detainees – is manifestly improper, seems all too obvious. Chief justice Naor, who wrote the 
central opinion in Desta, has stated that – 
"That purpose would be improper, given that it allegedly compromises the principle of non-
refoulment, forbidding the deportation of a person to a state where his life or freedoms are in 
danger"138. 
 
                                                                 
138 Desta, preamble 81 to Chief Justice Naor’s central opinion 
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If the judges had accepted the petitioners’ claim regarding the hidden- purpose of the 
amendment, the constitutional examination would have had to stop here, since a statute which 
limits constitutional rights for no proper - purpose is void139.  
 
In Eitan, justice Vogelman, who wrote the central opinion, was very receptive to that 
explosive claim of the petitioners, but given that chapter D was destined to be annulled 
altogether for it do not withstand the proportionality condition, he preferred not to decide on 
that matter – 
 
"…the question of whether one of the purposes of the Law which we are currently examining 
its constitutionality, is "breaking the spirits" of the infiltrators - so that they would choose to 
leave the country, is not clear of doubts… even though I am not convinced that the appellant's 
claims in that issue can be utterly revoked, I shall not reach any conclusion on that issue, since 
I believe that chapter D of the law will anyway be revoked since it doesn’t withstand the 
demand of proportionality"140. 
 
While justice Vogelman had at least thoroughly examined the petitioner’s claim regarding the 
secret purpose of the amendment, Chief Justice Grunis, who dissented from the majority 
regarding the annulment of chapter D of the law, didn’t even consider the claim that the actual 
purpose of the law is to break the detainees’ spirit: 
  
"my colleague also notes the appellants' claim according to which the true purpose of the 
arrangement outlined in chapter D is to "break the infiltrators spirit" so they would agree to 
voluntarily leave Israel (regarding which the answerers have firmly claimed otherwise). Like 
my colleague, I shall not deliberate whether that is indeed one of the law's purposes"141. 
  
Three months after the Court has issued its judgment in Eitan, the Knesset once again passed a 
new amendment to the law. Now, the added chapter D of the law allowed holding ‘infiltrators’ 
in an “open” detention center for 20 months. The constitutionality of the amendment was now 
challenged, for the third time, in Desta. By now, the petitioners have already accumulated 
substantial experience with the way this chapter of the law was implemented, in its present and 
old versions, and with its actual results on the ground, and so they could now support their 
claim about the hidden purpose of the law with conclusive evidence. Most telling of these 
evidence, was not the decisive number of detainees in the ‘Holot’ “open” detention center who 
have ‘voluntarily’ returned to their countries of origin, but the actual composition of the 
“open” center’s population; it appeared to be that in contrast to their relative number in the 
                                                                 
139 See: R Ziegler, ‘In the Land of Hidden Legislative Aims: HCJ 8665/14 (detention of asylum-seekers in Israel – 
round 3)’, Versa, 4 Sep. 2015 – http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/viewpoints/land-hidden-legislative-aims-hcj-866514-
detention-asylum-seekers-israel-round-3  
140 Eitan, preamble 113 to justice Vogelman’s central opinion  
141 Eitan, preamble 27 to Chief Justice Grunis’ opinion 
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general population of migrants in Israel, 76% of the detained ‘infiltrators’ in ‘Holot’ center 
were Sudanese, and the rest were Eritrean. Even though the State refrains from expelling both, 
Eritrean nationals are covered by a temporary protection regime while Sudanese are allegedly 
not being expelled only due to the lack of diplomatic relationship between Israel and Sudan. In 
that way and others, they have seemed to be targeted by the MOI, who may assume that they 
are the less resistant of the two groups – an assumption corresponding with the fact that many 
more Sudanese nationals have in fact ‘voluntarily’ returned to their country of origin. 
  
Not only these circumstantial evidence were added in support of the petitioner’s consistent 
claim, but also the minister of Interior’s public statement on the day the Court issued its ruling 
in Eitan, saying that the annulled law had given a substantial contribution to the furthering of 
‘voluntarily return’ of the ‘infiltrators’ being held in ‘Holot’. On top of it, the petitioners have 
handed the Court affidavits of several detainees in ‘Holot’, claiming that the staff in the 
detention center is applying constant and unfair pressure on them to give up their asylum 
requests and to ‘voluntarily’ return to their countries of origin.  
 
Apart from chief justice Naor, who assertively concluded that "I have not reached the 
conclusion that the current law is meant to break the spirits of the infiltrators", other judges 
seemed to be taken, not to say convinced, by the petitioners' claim about the hidden purpose of 
the law142. From their conclusive argumentation it is hard to understand though, why have not 
a single one of them affirmatively accepted the validity of that claim and so proclaimed the 
chapter is void altogether for not-withstanding the condition regarding a proper purpose. So 
goes, for example, justice Vogelam: 
  
"…despite the state attorney's statement in the procedure at hand, according to which "of 
course of course of course" that no action is or will be taken to break a person's spirit…the 
state did not relate to the appellants'' concrete claims – which were backed by affidavits- 
according to which heavy pressure to leave the country was indeed put on them…the question 
regarding the identities of the people being sent to 'Holot' and the criteria determined in that 
regard by the administrative authority, is still with us since Eitan…once again I do not seek to 
replace that question mark with an exclamation mark and rule about the existence or absence 
of that claimed purpose… however, I believe that even if we're unable to determine that the 
purpose of chapter D of the law is "applying pressure" on the infiltrators to agree to leave 
Israel, enough was said so that we may hinder from any positivistic ruling in this matter."143 
 
What seems odd is that from the culmination of the supporting figures and the many doubts 
arisen, justice Vogelman failed to reach the positive conclusion that the law’s actual purpose is 
                                                                 
142 Desta, preamble 81 to Chief justice Naor’s central opinion 
143 Desta, preamble 26, 27 to justice Vogelman’s opinion 
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to further ‘voluntarily’ return of the detained ‘infiltrators’. What is even harder to understand 
is how justice Vogelman permits himself to leave a question mark where he is supposed to 
consider and reach a concrete conclusion on a matter so inherent to the constitutional 
examination that the Court is supposedly doing. 
  
Justice Amit’s rhetoric is even more decisive, and yet, he too refrains from giving a conclusive 
answer in regard to the claim about the hidden purpose of the law – 
 
"The current law uses a method of 'centrifugal circulation' by way of extracting the infiltrators 
from the cities' centers, centrifugally waving them to the end of the desert for 20 months, and 
from there back to the cities' centres, while extracting others from the cities' centres to 'fill in 
the gaps' in the incarceration facility. This winding path… arouses the suspicion that perhaps 
behind the stated purpose of preventing infiltrators from settling down, hides a purpose of 
'kicking them around' and breaking their spirit, as was claimed by the appellants. Therefore I 
join the question mark brought up by judge Vogelman in his deliberation in the purpose of 
encouraging voluntary departure, in regard to the gap between the stated and the actual 
purposes of the law."144 
  
The negligence of the administrative authority in reaching decisions regarding the detainees’ 
asylum requests, and the virtually nonexistent refugee recognition rate in relation to the 
extremely low number of decisions that are being taken, are augmented in justice Meltzer’s 
doubts regarding the real purpose of the law, but he, like his colleagues, is yet again somewhat 
reluctant in reaching positive findings about the subject matter –  
 
"The non-treatment, in our context, may imply that the proper purpose that was stated 
(prevention of settling down in cities' centers) – is in fact not the main purpose, and that there 
are other hidden purposes, no lesser in importance than the stated one, in pursuit of which the 
state acts, as it seems, in contradiction to its authorities' commitments as are derived from 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (paragraph 11), and in alleged contradiction to its 
international commitments, which it has taken upon itself in joining the Refugee Convention 
(and which Israel and different other Jewish organizations took part in its initiation and 
articulation")145. 
 
What might explain this anomalous failure of the judges to coherently follow their reasoning 
and positively determine that the purpose of the law is to generate a constructive-expulsion of 
the detainees? – In my view, the sudden reluctance of the judges from refuting the formal 
position of the state on this contentious matter stems from the intimate relevance of that issue 
                                                                 
144 Desta, preamble 5 to justice Amit’s opinion  
145 Desta, preamble 13 to justice Metltzer’s opinion 
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to Israel’s compliance with the provisions of the Refugee Convention, and more specifically, 
with the fundamental principle of non-refoulement.  While annulling the law or some parts of 
it due to its un-proportionate limitation on the constitutional rights of the detainees didn’t 
require the judges to determine whether those detainees are asylum seekers and refugees or 
merely migrant workers, doing the same but for the fact the law has the illegitimate purpose of 
furthering a constructive expulsion would inherently imply that those detainees are in fact 
asylum seekers and refugees whose expulsion is then unacceptable. In other words, bypassing 
this argument suits perfectly the judges’ governmental-minded approach on issues that relate 
to the core of international refugee law – recognition and non-refoulement146. For them, 
acknowledging the state's hidden purpose in this case, is equally acknowledging also its 
illegality directly due the non-refoulment principle and its applicability to the so called 
‘infiltrator’, but here I would assume that by keeping this issue 'under the rug' by "staying 
doubtful" about the state's intention to practically commit an act of non-refoulment, they also 
hinder from igniting that cascade of syllogisms which will eventually lead to the inevitable 
conclusion, that those detainees at stake are in fact Refugees. 
  
Somewhat surprisingly, justice Meltzer was not the only judge to attribute his suspicion also to 
the virtual zero recognition rate of asylum seekers as refugees by the administrative authority. 
Justice Haiut was just as much preoccupied with those figures – 
 
"In the face of the state's conductance regarding Eritrean and Sudanese nationals, it seems that 
these nationals are trapped in an ongoing and impossible state of normative mist regarding 
their status…on the one hand they are not directly deported to their country of origin due to 
practical obstacles (North Sudan) or due to the conditions in their country of origin and the 
non-refoulment principle (Eritrea), but on the other hand the state doesn't rule within a 
reasonable time-frame regarding the asylum requests they have filed, and when it finally does, 
it validates only a negligible percentage of them which is something that arises questions in 
light of the recognition rates of asylum requests filed by people of those same nationalities 
elsewhere in the world" 147. 
 
In response to that harsh critique of the judges, Avi Himi, chairman of the advisory committee 
on refugees reporting to the Minister of Interior, seems to have no interest at all in 
downplaying the judges’ complicity in the ‘denial of refugee-hood’, and so he states the 
obvious – 
   
                                                                 
146 That this matter is of primary importance for the asylum seekers detainees – seems fairly obvious. Haaretz’s 
investigation on the fate of Eritrean and Sudanese detainees who ‘voluntarily’ left Israel to a third country shows 
that their departure, facilitated by the state, was to Ethiopia or Ruanda, where no formal status was granted to 
them, thus risking them with expulsion back to their countries of origin – see: I lior, ‘Israel is sending asylum 
seekers to Rwanda without status’, Haartez, 4.4.2014     
147 Desta, preamble 3-4 to justice Haiuth’s opinion 
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"The committee's decisions are subdued to legal review from the courts, who have generally, 
if not completely, accepted the advisory committee's stances, since those stances are written 
based on international law and rules of morals and justice, without any agenda or anything 
else." 148 
 
The judges’ sudden eruption of interest in the illusionary recognition rate at first instance is 
not only ironical due to the mere illusionary recognition rate at the Court level – which should 
have also raised questions about the Court, given the much higher recognition rate on appeals 
in other countries149 – but also and especially because in different cases the Courts have 
established their own revocations of asylum requests based on this virtually inexistent 
recognition rate of the administrative authority whose decisions they reviewed – 
 
"The presumption embedded in the appellant's claims, as if asylum seekers should be treated 
as refugees, is not anchored neither in the refugee convention nor in Israeli law. Noteworthy in 
this context is the fact that out of all of the asylum requests inspected, a very minor, almost 
non-existent number, was approved. And there are indications that most of the infiltrators have 
come to Israel for the purpose of working and improving their standard of living.”150 
 
In comparison to the many judgments which routinely upheld the administrative standard-
negative decisions, or simply recast the case back for reexamination at first instance – what 
was, if anything, so different about the two single judgments of the Court ordering the 
government to grant someone the refugee status?  
 
                                                                 
148  I Lior, ‘one month after the chairman of the advisory committee’s resignation, no successor was appointed’, 
Haaretz, 20.8.2015     
149 Eurostat provides date on the recognition rate at the appeal level in Member States of the EU. Since the 
Asylum Procedure Directive does not contain harmonized standards for the arrangement of the appeal procedures 
, and due to the consequent discrepancy between the appeal mechanism in different Member States, as well as for 
lack of sufficient data regarding several MS – “Eurostate data regarding second instance decisions is therefore 
difficult to analyze”. Bearing that in mind,  recognition rates for the Geneva Status granted by the appeal bodies 
in 2012 are as follow : France – 12%; Germany – 7%; Sweden – 5%; UK – 25%; Belgium – 2%; Austria – 16%; 
Romania – 7%; Greece – 11%; Denmark – 15%; Italy – 4%; Poland – 2%; Luxembourg – 1%; Ireland – 7%; 
Hungary – 5%; Finland – 27%; Slovakia – 7%; Latvia – 10%.  Recognition rate on appeals in the following MS is 
around 0%: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Estonia. Notwithstanding the 
significant differences within the first group of MS, it is nevertheless clear that the recognition rate on appeal in 
all of these countries is substantial and of course many times higher than the Israeli one. Regarding the second 
group of MS which dubious recognition rate on appeal resembles the Israeli one: first, in most of the 
abovementioned countries the total number of appeals examined by the competent appeal bodies amounts to only 
some few dozen. Second, the extremely low recognition rate may reflect the profiles of the applicants whose 
appeals are reviewed. At the same time, Eritreans and Sudanese, whose recognition as refugees is extremely high 
all over the world, constitute 90% of the asylum seekers’ population in Israel. Third, my essential claim about the 
anomaly in relation the reluctance of the Israeli Court to intervene in administrative asylum decisions is based on 
the Image and the actual record of the Israeli Court as for being one of the most daring, pro-active, in the world. It 
is hard to establish whether such a claim is valid also in relation to the Bulgarian or the Slovenian Courts, for 
example. See: Data Source – Eurostate, in EASO Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European 
Union 2012, Publication office of the European Union, 2013, p.25, 101       
150 The District Court of Beersheba – sitting as Court of administrative matters – Case 34577-01-14, Haron Ali v. 
the ministry of Interior (19.8.2014) 
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Neither in the framework of Hernendez151 nor in Barhana 152 are there any direct allusions to 
the Holocaust. But such references, as we have seen, are not to be found also in the vast 
majority of the court’s rejectionist decisions. Conversely, what seems to be a corner stone of 
virtually all of the court’s decisions on asylum cases - a short exposition of the Jewish context 
of the Refugee Convention – is missing in those two extraordinary decisions. Here, justices 
Marzel and Amir restricted themselves to the question – what is the law? And they answered – 
the Refugee Convention. Nothing more on the history of the convention. And what they did 
next was striving to apply it to the case at hand, without making recourse to any extra-judicial 
sources. Moreover, it seems that these two judges are relatively more-keen to conduct a 
comparative examination of international refugee law and its customary interpretation.  
 
Generally speaking, the judges in these cases did nothing more than to apply the conventional, 
widely accepted standard of burden of the proof regarding the petitioners’ seemingly well- 
founded fear of being persecuted, and giving them the benefit of the doubt where they were 
entitled to enjoy it. But the fact is that apart from one single verdict which wrongly sets forth a 
requirement of objective documentary evidence to support the applicant’s claims153, no other 
judge has ever spoken out about derogating from the customary principles in this field of law 
and the wide accepted standards stemming from them. But it does not mean the judges do not 
do exactly that; I could not find but one single judgment in which the judge had seemed to 
mistake fear for one’s life with the much larger bundle of rights whose infringement also 
constitutes persecution, and in that case, since justice Ohad “…do not get the impression that 
her life will be in danger in her country of origin" , she said to be convinced " …that this is a 
false appeal"154 .But, again, under their magnitude-scaling glasses, it seems from the record 
that justice Ohad simply cannot be the only judge to look solely for signs of threat to life while 
overlooking fear of being persecuted in a less than a fatal way. 
  
In other words, the Israeli judges are real Feinschmeckers, they talk the talk of international 
refugee law, but they are not truly committed to its framework. They are secretly attached to 
                                                                 
151 The District Court of Lod – sitting as a Court of administrative matters – Case 3415-05-10, Hernandaz v. the 
Minister of Interior (August 2011) 
152 The District Court of Jerusalem – sitting as a Court of administrative matters, Case 729-09-11, Barhana v. the 
Minister of Interior (December 2011) 
 
153- "It is expected from someone raising such claims to support them with documents which prove at least the 
actual approach to the police, if not the way in which the police had handled the matter. In reality the appellant 
has not provided any documentation, neither of his going to the police nor of the way he was assisted by the 
police in leaving Nigeria… the simple fear of the appellant for his peace if he stays in the capital region of 
Nigeria, not supported by any objective evidence, does not comply with the treaty's demands even if there's truth 
in the claim that the appellant is in danger in his area of residence, even if we could have said (which we namely 
can't) that the reason for persecution is found within the treaty's definition. The outcome of those is that the 
appellant has failed to prove that his life is in danger if he is deported to Nigeria…" - The District Court of 
Jerusalem – sitting as a Court of administrative matters, Case 31600-03-11 Okphor v. the Minister of interior 
(September 2011). Compare: Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, HNHCR, Geneva (16 
December 1998) 
154 The District Court of Lod – sitting as Court of administrative matters, Case 47890-03-11 Slada v. the Ministry 
of Interior (March 2011). This short verdict lacks even the most trivial factual background – which is the 
appellant’s country of origins? 
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another framework, to the ‘Holocaust framework’. The only difference between the two 
extraordinary decisions of the Court that recognized asylum seekers as refugees, and all of the 
many other rejectionist decisions issued by the Courts, is that justices Marzel and Amir had 
applied the respective norms of international refugee law also de facto. Since the Israeli judges 
usually display a pro-active, very daring approach in almost all other cases, we cannot 
attribute their reluctance to interfere in administrative asylum decisions to some sort of general 
incompetence or lack of independence. According to the Supreme Court’s case law, which 
was quite ironically mentioned by justice Haiut in relation to the doubts arisen by the 
inexistent refugee recognition rate at first instance, in comparison to other countries – "The 
end indicates the beginning"155 . Now it seems appropriate to ask - what does the inexistent 
refugee recognition rate at the Court level may tell us about the Israeli- judges? I believe that 
the outcome of virtually all asylum appeals, that is, the somewhat inevitable final negative 
decision on practically all asylum application considered by the Courts, indicates the 
commitment of the Israeli judges to the Holocaust framework with its ideological pressing 
imperatives rather than to the international refugee law and its appropriate implementation.   
  
                                                                 
155 HCJ 11163/03 High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizen of Israel v. the Prime Minister (27.2.2006), in Desta 
– Preamble 3 to justice Haiut’s opinion   
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
The Illusory asylum appeals brought before the Courts lead us to the judges’ commitment to 
the ‘Holocaust Framework’, and to their deep ideological conviction about the Holocaust’s 
uniqueness. The Activities of other Israeli and Jewish actors who further this sacred 
perception of the Holocaust in different fields constitute together a paradigm of rejection and 
reluctance to acknowledge and recognize the suffering of others for what they really are, a 
paradigm that seems to correspond perfectly with the Israeli judges’ exclusionary approach 
vis-à-vis asylum seekers. The centrality of past persecution and refugee-hood in the collective 
memory of the Israeli-Jewish public, the ideology and the political aim of the notion of its 
uniqueness, and the historical Jewish context of the Convention - serving as a nexus between 
past and contemporary refugee matters, all explain why not recognizing present-day asylum 
seekers as refugees is tantamount to preserving the uniqueness of the Holocaust, which in turn 
is an invaluable and indispensible political tool, or rather a cynical yet extremely efficient 
political leverage, being used time and again by those Jewish and Israeli actors in their 
different fields and realms. This L.LM thesis has put forward an examination of several telling 
allusions to the Holocaust found only in a number of cases, where judges seemed to believe 
that their ruling is favorable for the asylum seeker in regard to her pressing needs, and thus 
permitting themselves to reveal the subtle connotations triggered in them when they think of 
present day asylum seekers. 
 
But these allusions may be peculiar and strident enough in the given context - that of the 
apparent inexorable refusal of Israeli institutions to actually implement a treaty which is said 
to be a direct derivative of the Jewish holocaust, so that we may inspect them with due 
seriousness and come to the conclusion, that as ironic as it may be, there is a profound bias  
found in the Israeli judges' considerations when they finally get the chance to make a change 
and show the benevolence their ancestors once craved for. And sadly enough, these just might 
be their ancestors' phantoms in the old photographs, with their striped prisoner uniforms, the 
yellow badge on their chest, and the sign saying Arbeit Macht Frei behind them, unwantedly 
preventing them from doing so. Them, and the quiet machinery of indoctrination built around 
them.      
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